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United States v. Miggins: A Survey of
Anticipatory Search Warrants and the Need
for Uniformity Among the Circuits
INTRODUCTION
Federal appellate courts have addressed anticipatory search war-
rants since the late 1970s.' An anticipatory warrant differs from a tradi-
tional search warrant in that a court issues it before the contraband
reaches the place to be searched and thus is "peculiar to property in
transit."2 Its issuance requires a supporting affidavit alleging facts suffi-
cient to provide a magistrate with probable cause to believe that the
contraband will be at the place to be searched at the time of the search.'
Although the specific requirements vary by circuit, anticipatory
search warrants generally involve authorities' intercepting contraband4
in transit, either through the mail or by automobile.5 They then ask a
magistrate judge to issue a search warrant based on probable cause that
the contraband will reach its destination in a "controlled delivery," and
will be waiting at the place to be searched at the time of the search.6
Usually, the authorization to execute the warrant will be conditioned
upon the occurrence of a specific event, sometimes referred to as a "trig-
gering event," such as the delivery of the package containing the contra-
band and its introduction into the premises specified in the anticipatory
search warrant.7
As the United States Supreme Court has yet to address the require-
ments for anticipatory warrants, requirements vary by circuit.' This
1. United States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1978). The first case, however, to address
a warrant with anticipatory characteristics was Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1969).
2. United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1425 (7th Cir. 1996).
3. United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1998).
4. Usually, the contraband is narcotics (see United States v. Becerra, 97 F.3d 669, 670 (2d
Cir. 1996)), or, in the case of child pornography, the government will mail the contraband itself as
the result of undercover operations aimed at catching purveyors and consumers of child
pornography (see United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 362 (3d Cir. 1999)).
5. See United States v. Moetamedi, 46 F.3d 225, 226 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70, 73 (1st Cir. 1999).
6. See Leidner, 99 F.3d at 1425.
7. See United States v. Moetamedi, 46 F.3d 225, 227 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994).
8. See David P. Mitchell, Recent Development: Anticipatory Search Warrants: The Supreme
Court's Opportunity to Reexamine the Framework of the Fourth Amendment, 44 VANr. L. REV.
1387, 1388-90 (1991) (examining the place of anticipatory search warrants within established
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and recognizing that the Supreme Court, as of 1991, had not
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Comment will survey the requirements of each circuit and illustrate the
similarities and differences among the circuits. In addition, it will
examine the recent Sixth Circuit decision in United States v. Miggins9
and discuss the manner in which Miggins misapplies precedent from its
own jurisdiction.
As the Sixth Circuit has deviated from its own precedent in Mig-
gins, this Comment will also demonstrate the manner in which the other
circuits have likewise failed to follow any central precedent dealing with
anticipatory warrants. Due to the inconsistency in and among the cir-
cuits, the possibility that the circuits will continue to depart from prece-
dent, and the lack of motivation and power to adopt a uniform rule, there
is a dire need for uniformity in this area of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. The definitive authority in the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court, should unify the circuits'
approach to anticipatory warrants.
UNITED STATES V. MIGGINS
Miggins arose from the Nashville police's controlled delivery of a
Federal Express package from Los Angeles to the residence of defendant
Charles Moore. ° The package contained more than a kilogram of
cocaine. The affidavit securing the warrant to search Moore's apartment
stated, in part, that "[w]hen [the package containing the cocaine] is
delivered to [Moore's residence] and possession of the package is taken
by someone inside [Moore's residence], as is anticipated, then and only
then will the search warrant be executed.""
One of Moore's three co-defendants signed for the package outside
addressed the issue). See also James A. Adams, Anticipatory Search Warrants: Constitutionality,
Requirements, and Scope, 79 Ky. L.J. 681, 688 (1991) (recognizing that, as of 1991, the Supreme
Court had yet to address the issue of anticipatory search warrants, examining Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(a), and undertaking a detailed examination of the components of
anticipatory search warrants, including the purposes of controlled deliveries, alternatives to
controlled deliveries, and the general requirements for a valid anticipatory search warrant);
Andrew M. Belt, Comment: Anticipatory Search Warrants: State and Federal Applications and
Their Future in Maryland, 28 U. BALT. L. Rv. 337, 341 (1999) (recognizing that the Supreme
Court, as of 1999, had yet to address the issue of anticipatory search warrants). Belt, along with a
thorough review of anticipatory search warrants in state courts, divided the federal courts into two
categories: those that apply the "sure course" test as the measure of an anticipatory warrant's
validity, and those that use "an alternative analysis," consisting of "independent evidence giving
rise to probable cause that the contraband will be located at the premises at the time of the search"
(citing United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir. 1989)). This paper will provide a
survey of the cases dealing with anticipatory search warrants by federal circuit courts of appeals.
9. 302 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2002).
10. Id. at 387.
11. Id. at 394.
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of Moore's residence.' 2 All three immediately left and took the package
with them without taking it into the house.'3 According to one officer
who witnessed the controlled delivery, all three co-defendants present
"went in and out of Moore's residence before [one co-defendant] signed
for the package."' 4 One of Moore's co-defendants, however, testified
that none of them entered Moore's residence before anyone signed for
the package.' 5 Regardless of the means of delivery, the officers exe-
cuted the search warrant. 16
Moore moved to suppress evidence of a firearm seized at his home
upon the execution of the search warrant.17 The United States District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee denied the motion, finding
that there was probable cause for issuance of the anticipatory warrant
and that the "triggering event" for the warrant had occurred.' 8 Moore
was found guilty of the charge of being a felon in possession of a
firearm.' 9
On appeal, Moore challenged the district court's denial of his
motion to suppress,2° arguing that the triggering event upon which exe-
cution of the warrant depended did not occur.2 ' The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals disagreed, stating that:
[T]he triggering event required the delivery and acceptance of the
package by someone inside the residence. On its face, the affidavit
does not require that the person receiving the package actually be
inside the residence when the package is delivered or that the person
receiving the package take it inside the residence and remain in
doors.22
Miggins is not the first Sixth Circuit case to address anticipatory
search warrants. As this Comment will demonstrate, however, it marks
a departure from previous Sixth Circuit jurisprudence.
A SURVEY OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Sixth Circuit first dealt with anticipatory search warrants in
12. Id. at 394-95.
13. Id. at 394.
14. Id. at 395.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 389.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 389-90 (the court further found that even if the triggering event did not occur, the
good faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), applied).
19. Id. at 390.
20. Id. at 394.
21. Id.
22. Id.
2004]
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United States v. Lowe.23 As part of a "routine drug inspection of pack-
ages originating in Thailand, a known source of heroin," the Detroit Post
Office opened a package addressed to someone in Detroit,24 and found
heroin.25 The package was resealed and delivered to the defendant's
home one day after a warrant was issued for the search and seizure of
the heroin.26
The defendant argued that there was no basis for finding probable
cause that the contraband was presently located at the defendant's
house27 since the search warrant was issued before the delivery. The
court ruled that probable cause existed to support the warrant once the
package was delivered in "due course by the Post Office. '28 The court
further stated that "[c]ontraband does not have to be presently located at
the place described in the warrant if there is probable cause to believe
that it will be there when the search warrant is executed. '29 This was
certainly the case here, as "responsible officials" advised the issuing
magistrate that "certain controllable events will occur in the near
future," i.e., the controlled delivery of the heroin by the Detroit Post
Office to the defendant's home.3 °
The next Sixth Circuit case to address anticipatory search warrants
was not decided until 1991.31 In United States v. Rey, a customs inspec-
tor found cocaine in an express mail package addressed to "Grace Rich-
ardson" of Nashville, Tennessee.32 The inspector forwarded the package
to the Nashville Post Office, which turned it over to the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA).33 The DEA obtained search warrants for
the package and for the apartment to which it was addressed.3 4 The
warrant's stipulations allowed any adult at the address to sign for the
package.35
When the DEA agent attempted the controlled delivery, the defen-
dant answered the door and identified himself as Leroy Rey.36 Rey
23. 575 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1978).
24. Id. at 1193. The court also held "that the package from Thailand could be opened and
inspected by customs officials in Detroit rather than Los Angeles, the original port of entry for the
package." Id. at 1194.
25. Id. at 1193.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1194.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1991).
32. Id. at 1218.
33. Id.
34. Id. The agents replaced all but two grams of the six kilograms of cocaine with sugar. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1219. The postal inspector asked for the package's addressee, "Mrs. Richardson."
[Vol. 58:701
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signed for the box and took it into the apartment.37 Shortly thereafter,
Rey left the apartment and was arrested as he drove away.38 Agents told
Rey that they had a search warrant for the apartment to which they had
delivered the package. Rey admitted he lived in the apartment and had
signed for the package,39 and that he let the agents in.4" The agents
found the package unopened "within a foot or two of the door," and
executed the search warrant.41
The defendant argued that probable cause for the anticipatory
search warrant existed only for the seizure of the controlled delivery
package and nothing else in the apartment.42 This was so, the defendant
argued, because the affiant had no knowledge of any of the defendant's
illegal activities and had no knowledge of any illegal activities taking
place in the apartment prior to the controlled delivery.43
At the suppression hearing, however, the affiant testified that the
mail carrier for the apartment had seen several of "these types of pack-
ages" delivered there before, so the court concluded that there were prior
indications of illegal activity at the apartment.44 Furthermore, the court
cited three cases from other circuits in support of the proposition that a
controlled delivery alone may support probable cause to search a resi-
dence for more than just the package subject to the controlled delivery. 45
The defendant also argued that the search warrant was defective
because the warrant itself did not specify that execution depended upon
the controlled delivery.46 In response, the court stated that "[a]lthough it
may be preferable to make such a statement, the warrant's silence on
this point does not render it void."47 The affidavit did request authoriza-
tion for a search "subsequent to the delivery of the package," and thus "a
reasonable inference can be made that the warrant authorized a search
Id. at 1218. The defendant said, "Yes," and the inspector "specified that he was looking for 'Grace
Richardson' and that defendant 'didn't look like Grace' . . . [but the] defendant stated that he
would 'take it' and signed his name to the express mail label." Id. at 1218-19.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1220.
43. Id.
44. Id. The affiant, a special agent for the DEA, also testified "that the apartment had been
under surveillance and defendant . . . had been seen at the apartment on the day before the
delivery." Id.
45. Id. at 1220-21 (citing United States v. Washington, 852 F.2d 803 804-05 (4th Cir. 1988));
United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 213 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Malik, 680 F.2d
1162, 1165 (7th Cir. 1982).
46. Id. at 1221.
47. Id. (citing State v. Wine, 787 S.W.2d 31 (Tenn. App. 1989)).
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only after the controlled delivery has occurred. If the controlled delivery
had not occurred, then the warrant would have been void. 48
In United States v. Lawson,"9 a postal inspector intercepted a pack-
age addressed from Phoenix, Arizona, to "David Lawson" of Kent,
Ohio. The package aroused the suspicion of a postal inspector because
it originated from a known source area for narcotics, had a nonexistent
return address, was heavily wrapped in tape, and smelled like coffee. °
A drug-sniffing dog alerted the inspector to the presence of narcotics in
the package," l and a subsequent search revealed six ounces of cocaine.52
The inspector resealed the package and submitted an affidavit for an
anticipatory search warrant.53
The affidavit "made it clear that execution of the warrant would
take place only if the package was 'successfully delivered and taken
inside the residence.' , 54 In addition to seeking authorization to recover
the package itself, the affidavit also sought permission to seize numer-
ous other items based on the inspector's "conclusions of what could
fairly be expected to be found at the place to be searched based upon
[facts of the initial package search] and upon [the inspector's] training
and experience in narcotics investigations. 55 The controlled delivery
took place, the defendant signed for the package, took it into his resi-
dence, and the warrant was executed.56
The defendant argued that the only link between himself and the
alleged drug trafficking was his name as addressee on the package,
which would be confirmed by his acceptance of the package.57 The
court rejected this argument, citing Rey for the proposition that "a war-
rant to search an address may be based solely on the fact that a package
containing illegal substances is on a 'sure course' to its destination (as in
the mail)."'58 The court also noted that, based on the amount of drugs
(six ounces of cocaine) and the manner of packaging (to avoid detec-
tion), the magistrate could reasonably determine that "an experienced
48. Id. (citing State v. Wahl, 450 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 1990)).
49. 999 F.2d 985, 986 (6th Cir. 1993).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The affidavit also "contained a description of the package (its contents), the
description of how the cocaine was concealed in the package in an attempt to avoid detection, and
the fact that the return address was phony." Id.
55. Id. Some other items to be seized included the controlled delivery package, mailing
records, cocaine, "drug implements used in the sale and distribution of cocaine, triple beam scales,
documents, records, cash, ledgers, and receipts related to cocaine transactions." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 987.
58. Id. at 988.
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trafficker in narcotics sent the package in question," and that "it was
very likely the address on the package was the one at which it was
intended to arrive."59
United States v. Jackson60 concerned a package mailed from Nige-
ria to East Cleveland, Ohio. A British customs official found the pack-
age suspicious based on its origin - a source country for illegal drugs
and its weight, which the official found heavy for the content
description of a picture frame.6' Inspection of the package revealed
eighty grams of heroin. 62  The contents were photographed, resealed,
and shipped to the Cleveland DEA.6 3
Once the package arrived, the DEA submitted an affidavit for an
anticipatory search warrant.' The affidavit stated that "[i]f the package
is successfully delivered and taken inside the residence, a Federal search
warrant will be executed shortly thereafter. The warrant will be exe-
cuted if, and only if, the package is accepted and taken inside the subject
"165premises.
Law enforcement officials made the controlled delivery, and one of
the defendants signed for the package and took it into the house. 66 Min-
utes later, agents announced that they had a warrant and entered the
home.6 7 The agents saw the two defendants running out of the back of
59. Id. The court provided a more detailed explanation, along with a discussion of Rey and
the sure course requirement:
Although Rey may be read to stand for the proposition that a warrant to search an
address may be based solely on the fact that a package containing illegal substances
is on a "sure course" to its destination (as in the mail), we note that in Rey and the
instant case there were additional facts in the magistrate's consideration of the
'totality of the circumstances.' The magistrate judge was in a position to determine
that one does not send six ounces of cocaine through the mail to a specific address
on a whim. The magistrate judge also knew through the affidavit that the cocaine in
the package was concealed in an attempt to avoid detection. This factor makes it
less likely that the defendant was 'set up' by someone and more likely that the
cocaine was intended to reach its destination undetected. All of the information
contained in the affidavit could reasonably lead a person to conclude that an
experienced trafficker in narcotics sent the package in question. Consequently, it
was very likely the address on the package was the one at which it was intended to
arrive.
Id.
60. 55 F.3d 1219 (6th Cir. 1995).
61. Id. at 1220-21.
62. Id. A field test indicated that the substance was heroin. Id. at 1221.
63. Id.
64. Id. Before the government applied for its anticipatory search warrant, the Cleveland DEA
first reopened the package pursuant to a search warrant. Id. The DEA then removed most of the
heroin and replaced it with "an equivalent amount of sham substance, adding to the sham
substance a few grams of the original heroin." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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the house.68 When caught one defendant had the package in his posses-
sion and was climbing a fence, and the other was caught near the back
door. 69 Agents then executed the search warrant.7°
On appeal, the defendant caught with the package argued that the
warrant was defective, as it did not "specifically require the package to
remain in the ... house after the delivery."71 The court rejected this
argument, stating that the warrant "took effect not upon issuance but at a
specified future time," meaning that the search could be made only after
the controlled delivery occurred.7 2 Therefore, the search did not violate
the Fourth Amendment just "because the suspects in the premises to be
searched abscond with the package upon its delivery."73 Once the pack-
age was accepted and taken inside, probable cause existed to search the
premises for the contraband as well as other evidence of drug
trafficking.74
The defendant also argued that the warrant created the potential for
abuse; it "vested executing agents with unfettered discretion because it
authorized them to search the premises after the package was no longer
present. '75 The court disagreed, holding that the warrant did not go
"stale" because the defendant left with the package. 76 The lapse of time
between the package delivery and the execution of the warrant was
"brief, '7 7 and the affidavit required only that the package be delivered
and taken into the home, not that it subsequently remain there.78
In United States v. Bender,79 a postal inspector intercepted a pack-
age sent from Opa Locka, Florida, to a Tennessee address. 80 At that
time (early 1996), postal inspectors had observed an increase in the
transportation of narcotics from Florida to Nashville, Tennessee through
the mail, and were thus looking for suspicious packages.8" In addition to
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1221-22.
70. Id. at 1222. Also seized from the home were items "indicative of drug trafficking ...
including 27 individual packets of marijuana, a large quantity of small plastic bags, a hollowed-
out library book, a DHL shipping envelope, and a pager." Id.
71. Id. at 1223.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1224.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The court also stated that agents "were not vested with undue discretion in the timing
of [the warrant's] execution" because "the warrant required that once the controlled delivery was
made, the search was to take place 'shortly thereafter.'" Id.
78. Id.
79. 265 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001).
80. Id. at 467.
81. Id.
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having a false name listed on the return address, a narcotics canine indi-
cated the presence of controlled substances.82 A search pursuant to a
warrant revealed more than twenty-one grams of crack cocaine.83 The
package was resealed along with a transmitter, which would beep slowly
as long as the package remained closed. Once opened, however, the
transmitter would beep quickly, functioning as an alarm.84 The postal
inspector submitted an affidavit for a search warrant which was subse-
quently granted.85
Next, agents attempted a controlled delivery.86  The defendant
accepted delivery and took the package into her home. 87 Three minutes
later, the transmitter indicated that the parcel had been opened.88 Agents
executed the warrant, and found her in a bedroom with the "opened par-
cel" beside her on the bed.89
The defendant argued for suppression of the seized evidence based
on lack of probable cause to issue the warrant and improper execution of
the warrant, because, the defendant claimed, they entered her home
before she opened the package.9" The court rejected both arguments.
First, there was probable cause to issue the search warrant, as "[t]his
case represent[ed] a typical controlled-delivery drug bust."9 In addi-
tion, neither the affidavit nor the warrant required that the package actu-
ally be opened prior to execution of the warrant.92 The warrant merely
required that the package be delivered and taken into the residence.93
United States v. Ware9 4 is the first Sixth Circuit case decided in the
wake of Miggins. In Ware, a narcotics dog at a Federal Express facility
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 468. The affidavit stated, in part, that the inspector wished to install a transmitter in
the package. Id. at 470. The "triggering event" for authorization to search the home was
acceptance of the package, signing of a delivery receipt, and taking the package into the residence.
Id. Neither the affidavit nor the warrant required that the transmitter be activated in order to
execute the warrant. Id.
86. Id. at 468.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. Agents also found receipts from money transfers, receipts from car rentals, "a mirror
with white powder on it ... small baggies, a vial containing white powder, marijuana, and razor
blades ... a small bag of cocaine ... vials, strainers, measuring spoons, scoops, and multicolored
baggies," beakers "with traces of cocaine," two loaded handguns, as well as other items. Id.
90. Id. at 469.
91. Id. at 470. The facts that led to this conclusion were "[t]he observed frequency of Express
Mail drug deliveries between Florida and the Nashville area, the positive identification of a
controlled substance by a drug detection dog, and the discovery of approximately 21.6 grams of
cocaine base in the Express Mail package." Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 338 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2003).
20041
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in Louisville, Kentucky alerted police to the possible presence of drugs
in a package.95 Police obtained two warrants, one to search the package,
and one "to insert an electronic tracking device and to enter any struc-
ture to seize the package if the device indicated that the package had
been opened."96 Inside the package, police found cocaine and then
repackaged a portion of the cocaine along with the tracking device.97
A detective then applied for a search warrant for the package's
delivery address. 98 Although the warrant itself authorized an "immedi-
ate search," the supporting affidavit stated, "a controlled delivery of this
parcel will be attempted." 99 In addition, the court stated, "[aill of the
officers involved considered this to be an anticipatory warrant."' °
The police delivered the package, and the defendant took it into his
apartment. He then left "carrying an opaque shopping bag, and the elec-
tronic monitor indicated to the police surveillance team that the package
was moving."' 0' The defendant drove away with the bag before being
arrested a short time later with the package containing the cocaine.'
Based on the warrant's authority, police took the defendant back to his
apartment and searched it, where they found drug paraphernalia and a
weapon. 103
The court held that the warrant was valid as an anticipatory search
warrant despite the "boilerplate on the form of the warrant application"
indicating an authorization for an immediate search."° Quoting Mig-
gins, the court stated, "'[W]arrants and their supporting documents are
to be read not hypertechnically, but in a commonsense fashion' . . . an
objectively reasonable officer would likely have concluded that the war-
rant legally authorized a search of the apartment only upon the con-
trolled delivery of the package."''  The supporting affidavit stated that a
controlled delivery would occur, and the officers searched the apartment
only after the controlled delivery took place, and thus the warrant and
search were valid.10 6
95. Id. at 478.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 479.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. It is unclear from the opinion whether the defendant had opened the package.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 482.
105. Id.
106. Id. ("[indeed, the police executed this warrant in accordance with their belief that it was
anticipatory, waiting until after the controlled delivery to search [the defendant's] apartment").
[Vol. 58:701
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First Circuit Court of Appeals
The initial First Circuit case addressing the question of anticipatory
search warrants was United States v. Ricciardelli.1°7 As part of a sting
operation, the government sent the defendant a catalogue of videotapes
containing child pornography. 10 8 The defendant ordered several video-
tapes, and the government told him that one tape was available and
would be shipped immediately."9 The government then obtained a
search warrant authorizing investigators to seize any items concerning
child pornography." The warrant itself stated that it would "not be
effective until after delivery by mail to and receipt by [the defendant] of
the .. .package containing the videotape."'I
A controlled delivery was attempted the next day.I" The postal
employee tried to deliver the package, but the defendant was not there to
sign for or accept the package." 3 The employee left a notice for the
defendant to pick up the package from the post office." 4 The defendant
picked it up later that day and returned home." 5 Half an hour later,
authorities executed the warrant." 6 They seized the videotape sent by
the authorities, along with several others not listed in the warrant.' 17
The defendant initially argued that anticipatory search warrants
were per se unconstitutional." 8 The court, however, noted that several
other circuits had already held that anticipatory search warrants are not
per se unconstitutional." 19 The court also stated that, despite the fact
107. 998 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1993).
108. Id. at 9. Houston police originally discovered the defendant's name on a list of suspected
recipients of child pornography during a 1975 investigation. Id. Police gave postal inspectors the
list in 1988. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 10. This was the "standard practice" of the post office. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The court also stated:
[Anticipatory search] warrants must, of course, be issued under proper
circumstances, upon a proper showing, and with proper safeguards. We hold,
therefore, that when law enforcement personnel offer a magistrate reliable,
independent evidence indicating that a delivery of contraband will very likely occur
at a particular place, and when the magistrate conditions the warrant's execution for
the search of that place on that delivery, the warrant, if not overbroad or otherwise
defective, passes constitutional muster. That the contraband has not yet reached the
premises to be searched at the time the warrant issues is not, in constitutional terms,
an insuperable obstacle.
Id. at 11.
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that the issuing magistrate knows when the warrant is issued that the
contraband is not presently located at the place to be searched, "the mag-
istrate must simply widen his horizons to take into account the likeli-
hood that the triggering event will occur on schedule and as predicted"
and that the contraband will be found at the place to be searched at the
time of the search.1 20
This warrant, however, failed to create an appropriate link between
the videotape and the defendant's home.12 Magistrates issuing anticipa-
tory search warrants must draw conditions for their execution that are
"'explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or
manipulation by government agents.' " 2 2
In particular, the executing agents' discretion must be limited in
two ways. First, "the magistrate must ensure that the triggering event is
both ascertainable and preordained."' 123  Second, "the contraband must
be on a sure and irreversible course to its destination, and a future search
of the destination must be made expressly contingent upon the contra-
band's arrival there."' 24 Implicit in the "sure and irreversible course"
standard is recognition that "the event on which the warrant is condi-
tioned bears a definite relationship to the premises to be searched."'' 21
The court referred to this as a "tri-comered nexus between the criminal
act, the evidence to be seized, and the place to be searched."'' 26
In this case, no nexus existed between the triggering event (the
defendant picking up the package) and the place to be searched (the
defendant's home).1 27 By the warrant's terms, the defendant could have
120. Id. at 10-11.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Id. (citing United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1989)).
123. Id. ("[tlhe warrant should restrict the officers' discretion in detecting the occurrence of the
event to almost ministerial proportions, similar to a search party's discretion in locating the place
to be searched").
124. Id.
125. Id. at 13.
126. Id.
127. Id. The court also wrote:
Here, the warrant authorized a search not of appellant's person but of his home, for
evidence relating to his dealings with child pornography distributors. The search
was to be triggered by delivery of the videotape. Thus, the very premise on which
the warrant rested was that the videotape's arrival would signal the existence of
probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime - the videotape itself - as well
as evidence of criminal predisposition or other nefarious activity was likely located
in the dwelling. The warrant's text, however, completely ignored this connection,
conditioning the search not on the arrival of the videotape at the place to be
searched, but, rather, on appellant's personal receipt of the videotape, wherever he
might be and wherever he might take his prize. By the terms of the warrant, once
appellant retrieved the package at the post office, the postal inspectors could have
searched his abode whether or not appellant brought the contraband there. An
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picked up the videotape and taken it anywhere other than his home, yet
the authorities could have searched his home regardless of whether the
defendant actually took the package home. 28 It is true that the defen-
dant did take the videotape home, but that did not help the warrant, as it
did not establish the "tri-cornered nexus" between the criminal act, the
evidence to be seized, and the place to be searched.' 29
In a later opinion by then Chief Judge Breyer, United States v. Gen-
dron"3 ° somewhat limited Ricciardelli's holding. In Gendron, the
defendant ordered and received a videotape containing child pornogra-
phy from a government sting operation.' Prior to delivery, govern-
ment agents applied for and received a search warrant authorizing a
search of the defendant's home for the tape "'after delivery by mail to
and receipt by [the defendant]' of a specifically described parcel (con-
taining the tape)."' 32 Based on Ricciardelli, the defendant argued that
the warrant was invalid, as it failed to specify the exact time when it
would take effect.'33 He argued that the search warrant's reference to
"delivery by mail to and receipt by [the defendant]" did not clearly
enough describe the triggering event because it could be interpreted to
mean "receipt" anywhere, as was the case in Ricciardelli.134
The court disagreed, and distinguished Ricciardelli. Here, the com-
plete "context" of the warrant included the house. Moreover, the war-
rant made it clear that the object of the search was a video, and it
mentioned delivery to the defendant's house. 35 The court stated that
"commonsense suggest[ed] that the words 'receipt by [the defendant]'
also refer[red] to receipt at [the defendant's] house, and not to receipt
downtown or at the Post Office."' 3 6
The most recent First Circuit case to address the topic was United
States v. Vigneau.1 ' There, the defendant and his co-conspirators regu-
larly traveled from Rhode Island to Texas where they would buy mari-
juana and steroids and ship them back to Rhode Island for sale.'38 For
large shipments, the defendants purchased two vans in El Paso,
anticipatory search warrant that cedes such great discretion to the executing agents
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 18 F.3d 955 (1st Cir. 1994).
131. Id. at 957.
132. Id. at 965.
133. Id. The warrant did not expire until ten days after issuance. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 966-67.
136. Id.
137. 187 F.3d 70 (1st Cir. 1999).
138. Id. at 72.
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Texas. 139
In September of 1995, "the DEA intercepted an Airborne Express
package with several pounds of marijuana and some steroids" mailed to
the defendant's wife's address.14 ° DEA agents sought a warrant based
on the intercepted package, stating that the "package has been resealed
and will be delivered by an undercover police officer posing as an Air-
borne Express deliveryman. Execution of this search warrant will not
take place until approximately (10) to (15) minutes after delivery has
been made."' 41
The magistrate issued a warrant and agents attempted delivery.' 42
When they arrived, however, they found a note on the door that said,
"Leave package here - be back in 15 min . . .,"'I Instead, the agents
kept watch for the next three hours. 1" They "then left the package at
the door, waited a brief period, and then entered and searched the
house."'14
5
The court held that simply "leaving the package at the door did
nothing to establish probable cause to search the premises - it was not
received by anyone inside the premises - so any concern about whether
the condition was satisfied or adequately set forth in the warrant is
beside the point."' 46 Based on the facts of the case, however, probable
cause existed to search the premises without the triggering event
occurring. 147
139. Id. at 73. They would sometimes use "U-Haul trucks filled with cheap furniture and
concealed the marijuana, which was shrink-wrapped in plastic, behind the furniture." Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 79. The warrant permitted a search of defendant's wife's apartment and a van. Id.
The defendant and his wife were "legally separated," but the address where the defendant's wife
lived was one "with which [the defendant] was otherwise connected." Id. at 73. Apparently, this
meant that the defendant resided there as well. See id. at 80 (the affidavit in support of the warrant
referred to the defendant as "one of the residents" at the address to be searched).
142. Id. at 79.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 80.
147. Id. Those facts were, as set forth in the affidavit:
[A] Warwick, Rhode Island, police detective was familiar with one of the residents
at [the address to be searched], [the defendant]; that he was known to traffic in
narcotics and was also known to use his vehicle to transport narcotics; that
electricity service at the house was in the name of [the defendant's wife] and there
was no 'David Weiber' [the person to whom the package was addressed] ... that
the van parked outside was registered to [the defendant], who had also been seen
entering and exiting the . . . apartment; and that another package (contents
unidentified) addressed to [the defendant and his wife] at [the address to be
searched] was being shipped there from Texas via Federal Express.
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals
In United States v. Garcia,4 8 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed for the first time the constitutionality of anticipatory search
warrants. In that case, informants at Miami International Airport were
found with cocaine. 149 The informants agreed to cooperate with DEA
agents and take some of the cocaine to the defendant in New York City
as part of a controlled delivery. 5 ° Based on these facts, agents applied
for and received an anticipatory search warrant "contingent upon the
delivery of cocaine by [informants]."' 51
On the day of the controlled delivery, informants knocked on the
apartment door and were given permission to enter.152 They sat down
and placed the cocaine-filled duffel bags next to them on the floor.1 53
Several minutes later, without anyone having taken possession of the
duffel bags from the informants, DEA agents executed the search
warrant. 1
54
The defendant argued for suppression on the basis that there was no
probable cause to believe that the cocaine was going to be in the defen-
dant's apartment at the time the warrant was issued. 15 The defendant
also argued that the condition governing the warrant's execution had not
occurred at the time of the search, as she had not actually taken delivery
when the search occurred. 156
The court first rejected the probable cause argument. 57 The impor-
tant consideration was that there is "'probable cause to believe that it
will be there when the search warrant is executed.' "158 Anticipatory
search warrants may withstand constitutional challenges where the con-
traband "is on a sure course to its destination."' 5 9 Once this determina-
148. 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1989).
149. Id. at 700-01. The informants here were couriers, servicemen in the U.S. military
stationed in Panama, used by defendants (one of the couriers was also a defendant) to smuggle
cocaine to New York. Id. On this particular job, defendants carried a combined thirty-three
kilograms of cocaine. Id. In Miami, "[c]ustoms officials noticed that the two servicemen
appeared nervous, and after recognizing [one courier's] name from a 'customs alert list,' searched
both couriers and discovered the cocaine." Id.
150. Id. at 701.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 702 ("when a government official presents independent evidence indicating that
delivery of contraband will, or is likely to, occur, and when the magistrate conditions the warrant
on that delivery, there is sufficient probable cause to uphold the warrant").
158. Id. (quoting United States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193, 1194 (6th Cir. 1978)).
159. Id. (quoting United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988)).
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tion is made by a magistrate, the magistrate should list the warrant
conditions governing the execution of the warrant "which are explicit,
clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipula-
tion by government agents," in order to protect against "premature
execution." 160
In regard to the defendant's second argument, the court stated that
the warrant did not require that the defendant or anyone else take posses-
sion of the cocaine, or that the informants give up possession of the
cocaine. 161 Instead, "the warrant listed an address that could be
searched by government agents as soon as the cocaine was delivered
there." 16 2
In United States v. Moetamedi,163 the court addressed an issue left
open by Garcia - "whether the conditions for execution of an anticipa-
tory search warrant must be stated in the warrant itself, or may be stated
only in the [supporting] affidavit."'" In Moetamedi, customs officials at
Kennedy Airport inspected the contents of a package addressed to a
New York location. 65 Inside, a customs official found a fifteen-inch
brass plate that separated into two pieces, within which agents found
approximately 775 grams of opium. 166 The defendant's name was
nowhere on the package, and officials mistakenly believed that "Data
Post," the name above the mailing address, was the addressee. 167 The
government learned, however, that the defendant lived at the mailing
address on the package 68 and submitted an affidavit in application for a
search warrant. 169
The affidavit for the warrant "expressly conditioned the search
upon [the defendant's] acceptance of the Package as an agent for Data
Post.' 70 The warrant itself, however, did not express any condition for
execution, and stated that "probable cause had been established" to
believe that the contraband was already there.' 7 1
On the day of the warrant's execution, the defendant accepted the
160. Id. at 703-04.
161. Id. at 704.
162. Id.
163. 46 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 1995).
164. Id. at 226.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. "Data Post" was the name of the international express mail company that shipped the
package. Id.
168. Id. at 227. A background check revealed no prior criminal history on the defendant or his
home. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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package as an agent for Data Post, signed his name, and took the pack-
age inside. 17 2 Agents executed the warrant and recovered the package as
well as more cocaine and a pipe with marijuana residue.' 73
The court held that, despite Garcia's language that "when an antici-
patory warrant is used, the magistrate should protect against its prema-
ture execution by listing in the warrant the conditions governing the
execution which are explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid
misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents,"' 74 the war-
rant here was valid, as those conditions were contained in the affidavit
of the warrant application. 7 5 In addition, the conditions listed in the
affidavit actually had to have been satisfied before the warrant was exe-
cuted, which occurred in this case.
176
United States v. Becerra 77 dealt with a package taken off of the
premises after a controlled delivery had been made. There, customs
agents intercepted a package mailed from Colombia to New York, con-
taining cocaine and addressed to the defendant. 78 Agents posing as
Federal Express employees called the defendant, who said she would be
at her home to pick up the package the next day.' 79 On this basis, the
government applied for and was issued "an anticipatory warrant that, by
its terms, would be triggered by the delivery of the parcel."'' 80
Agents then delivered the parcel and the defendant signed for it and
took it into her residence.' 8' A few minutes later, a co-defendant left the
apartment with the parcel. 182 Agents nonetheless executed the search
warrant, seizing evidence of drug trafficking."8 3
The defendant argued that the warrant become invalid once the
package was taken off the premises.' 84 The court rejected this
argument:
[T]he warrant (1) explicitly stated that it would be triggered by the
delivery of the parcel, and (2) was in no way conditioned on the con-
tinued presence of the package. Moreover, common sense dictates
that a suspect should not be able to evade the effects of a warrant
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 229 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1989)).
175. Id. at 229.
176. id.
177. 97 F.3d 669 (2d Cir. 1996).
178. Id. at 670.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 671.
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
simply by getting rid of the supposed contraband or its container.' 85
The package was delivered and the triggering event occurred, thus
the warrant was properly executed.
Third Circuit Court of Appeals
So far, the Third Circuit has decided only one case involving the
use of anticipatory search warrants. In United States v. Loy, i8 6 the U.S.
Postal Inspection Service and the Pennsylvania State Attorney General's
Office conducted an undercover child pornography investigation. An
agent of the Attorney General's Office placed an ad in a sexually
explicit magazine to which the defendant responded, stating that "he and
his wife had a 'good collection' of child pornography and he expressed
an interest in trading tapes" with the agent who placed the ad. 87 An
agent called the defendant to discuss a possible trade, and "gave detailed
descriptions of some of the tapes in his collection and told the agent that
he could 'put together' tapes for trading."' 8 8 The defendant also said
that he wished to receive pornographic material from the agent "involv-
ing girls ranging from eight to thirteen years of age. He specifically
requested that [the agent] send him a tape of girls between the ages of
eight and ten in a bathtub ('Bath Time video'), which the agent agreed to
do."' 8 9
The defendant sent another letter to the agent requesting the
video.' 90 The defendant listed a post office box as his return address. 19'
On this basis, the agent prepared the video for delivery to the defen-
dant's post office box and "submitted an affidavit and application for an
anticipatory search warrant" of the defendant's home. 192 The video was
then delivered to the defendant's post office box, and the agent observed
him accept its delivery. 193 Other agents continued to watch the defen-
dant and observed him take the tape with him as he returned home and
entered his residence. 94 The agent then executed the search warrant. 195
185. Id.
186. 191 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. The affidavit conditioned the search on the defendant's acceptance of the video "and
returning to his residence with the tape in his possession."
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. Agents recovered, apart from the video which was the subject of the warrant, another
tape of child pornography, fifteen "computer disks" with child pornography, fifty other
videotapes, "several pornographic magazines," and "various letters describing [the defendant's]
solicitation of child pornography and his offers to trade such materials."
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"As an initial matter," the court held, "anticipatory warrants which
meet the probable cause requirement and specifically identify the trig-
gering event are not per se unconstitutional."' 96 To satisfy the probable
cause requirement, the anticipatory warrant must state a "sufficient
nexus between the contraband to be seized and the place to be
searched."' 97 The magistrate "must find, based on facts existing when
the warrant is issued, that there is probable cause to believe the contra-
band... will be there when the warrant is executed."' 98 This normally
may be satisfied by a "controlled delivery of [the] contraband to the
place to be searched."' 99 In cases such as this, however, where the con-
traband is delivered somewhere other than the place to be searched, the
warrant "must present additional facts establishing [probable cause that]
the contraband will be taken to the place" to be searched.2" In this case,
the only support for the assumption that the defendant would take the
videotape to his home was the affiant's statement that he believed that
the defendant would behave in this manner. 20 ' There was no other evi-
dence that the defendant had ever taken child pornography from his post
office box to his home.20 2
While the defendant gave agents his home address, he "consistently
stated" that he wanted sexually explicit materials sent only to his post
office box.20 3 In addition, the defendant told agents that he only kept
"the stuff that's legal" in his house.20 4 The government argued that even
if the affidavit was insufficient to show that he kept any other child
pornography at his home, the judge could have inferred that the tape
would be there "based on the logical inference that [the defendant]
would, at least, take it home with him to view [it]." '20 5 This contention,
however, was still unsupported by the record, as the government had no
evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant was more likely to
view the tape "at his home as opposed to some other location. '20 6 The
government thus failed "to provide the requisite nexus between the con-
traband" and the place to be searched, i.e., the defendant's home.20 7
Agents executing the search, however, relied on the warrant in good
196. Id. at 364.
197. Id. at 365 (citations omitted).
198. Id. (citations omitted).
199. Id. (citations omitted).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 366 n.2.
204. Id. at 366.
205. Id. at 366.
206. Id. (citations omitted).
207. Id. at 367.
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faith, so the evidence seized from the defendant's home was not
suppressed.2 °8
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
Like the Third Circuit, the three Fourth Circuit cases dealing with
anticipatory search warrants involved child pornography. In United
States v. Goodwin,2 °9 the government used "various means" to identify
persons "predisposed towards [an interest] in child pornography," usu-
ally by answering advertisements the government placed in sexually
explicit magazines and by use of Customs Service lists of people who
previously had obscene material sent to them from overseas which had
then been seized.2 0
In this case, the defendant placed an advertisement in a magazine
stating that he wished to buy child pornography. 2 1 "Test correspon-
dence" from undercover government agents revealed that the defendant
placed the advertisement, and he replied saying that he wished to buy
child pornography, and that his interests included "teenage and pre-teen-
age sexual activity involving both heterosexual and homosexual
activity. 212
Four years later, "based on substantial previous evidence of predis-
position," the government sent another solicitation letter "plainly
focused on child pornography. '2 3 The defendant requested further
information and the government sent him a catalog.214 The defendant
ordered four magazines from this catalog to be sent to his home
address.2" The company sent two magazines 216 to the defendant's
home address and executed an anticipatory search warrant.21 7
As an initial matter, the court held that anticipatory warrants were
proper in certain circumstances.* 8 Where contraband is on a "sure
course to its destination, as in the mail, prior issuance of a warrant is
permissible. 121 9 Here, the affidavit established probable cause because
the affidavit described the government's correspondence with the defen-
208. Id. at 371.
209. 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988).
210. Id. at 34.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 34-35.
213. Id. at 35.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. The government mailed the defendant magazines it had "previously seized or purchased
during Postal Inspection Service investigations." Id.
217. Id. at 36.
218. Id. at 36 (citations omitted).
219. Id. (quoting United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1468 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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dant in detail, including his specific request for child pornography and
the fact that the materials would be sent to the defendant via United
States Postal Service.
22 0
United States v. Dornhofer,22 ' decided a little more than two
months subsequent to Goodwin, reaffirmed Goodwin's position that "an
anticipatory search warrant [was] permissible 'where the contraband to
be seized is on a sure course to its destination," as in the mail.' "212
Dornhofer's facts were largely similar to Goodwin's and involved the
same sting operation. 223 Here, the defendant ordered magazines con-
taining child pornography. 2 4 Having previously obtained an "anticipa-
tory search warrant, conditioned on [an agent's] placing the child
pornography in the mail," a government agent mailed the child pornog-
raphy to the defendant's address. 225  Agents watched the defendant
remove the magazines from his mailbox and take them into his apart-
ment.226 Agents executed the warrant and seized the magazines they
had just sent, as well as some other material.22 7
The court held the anticipatory search warrant to be valid.228 The
affidavit in support of the application for the warrant stated that the
agent would place the material in the mail and that the material would be
delivered to the defendant. 229 The issuing magistrate "conditioned the
validity of the search warrant on the contraband being so placed in the
mail. '230 Once the agent placed the material in the mail, Goodwin's
"sure course" requirement was met.23'
United States v. Cedelle232 also concerned a sting involving child
220. Id. at 36.
221. United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1988).
222. Id. at 1198 (quoting Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 36).
223. Id. at 1197. The operation worked as follows:
The government set up a Hong Kong company known as Far Eastern Trade
Company which solicited orders for child pornography from those suspected of
being consumers of child pornography. The sting operation targeted [the defendant]
as a result of a U.S. Customs seizure of child pornography that was addressed to
[the defendant]. Far Eastern sent a letter to [the defendant] offering to provide a
catalog of pornographic materials involving children. [The defendant] responded.
Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. The other materials included "a notebook made by [the defendant] that included
pictures of nude children, four novels and several magazines." Id.
228. Id. at 1198.
229. Id.
230. Id. It is unclear whether the warrant was conditioned on any event other than the material
being placed into the mail, such as the defendant accepting delivery of the material and taking it
into his home.
231. Id.
232. 89 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1996).
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pornography. In that case, the defendant replied to a government adver-
tisement in an adult magazine offering the sale of child pornography.233
The defendant sent a letter requesting videotapes of "young girls. 234
An undercover postal inspector replied, asking the defendant about his
specific interests.235 The defendant replied, stating that he wanted
"some video VHS of young girls about 11-15 [years old] more or less in
any type of sexual activities. 236 Postal inspectors again replied, this
time indicating availability of specific child pornography, and the defen-
dant replied again, stating that "he was 'very interested[;] 12 [years old]
or younger [was] nice' if it showed the minors engaged in not merely
fellatio but also copulation. 237 In one last letter, undercover officials
communicated to the defendant that "a videotape and some photographs
that met his expressed interests were available for $50.00," and the
defendant ordered all of them.238
The materials were mailed to the defendant's home address in the
name of an alias the defendant had given the undercover authorities.2 39
The inspectors then waited for the defendant to pick up his mail, which
he did a short time later.24° Instead of parking his car and going into his
home, however, the defendant drove away with the package. 24 ' After
executing a traffic stop, the inspectors arrested the defendant and
searched his car, seizing the package.242 The inspectors then searched
the defendant's home on the basis of an anticipatory search warrant they
had earlier obtained. 243
In denying the defendant's appeal of the district court's denial of
his suppression motion, the court briefly touched on the argument that
the search warrant of the defendant's home lacked probable cause.244
The court simply cited Goodwin and stated that the argument was "with-
out merit. 245
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Fifth Circuit has thus far only found one occasion on which to
233. Id. at 183.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. (alteration in original).
237. Id. (alterations in original).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 183-84.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 186
245. Id. (citing United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1988)).
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address the issue of anticipatory search warrants. In United States v.
Wylie,246 someone mailed a package to Minnesota from Texas via
UPS.2 47 UPS searched the package and found cocaine. 24 8 UPS gave the
package to police in Texas, who gave it the Texas DEA. 249 The DEA
then sent the package to its Minnesota office.25°
DEA agents wished to arrange a controlled delivery to the pack-
age's mailing address, but it was a motel and the addressee had already
checked out, leaving instructions for the package to be shipped back to
Texas to the defendant.25" ' An agent called the number that the
addressee had left, and the woman (the defendant) with whom the agent
spoke claimed to be the addressee's wife. 252 She told the agent "some-
one would be [at the Texas address] to receive the package. '253 The
package was shipped back to Texas, and "[o]nce the package was deliv-
ered to [the defendant's] residence, a search warrant was obtained. 254
The defendant argued that the affidavit in support of the warrant
lacked probable cause.255 The court held that the affidavit supplied
demonstrated probable cause, in part because of the fact that the UPS
package containing the drugs had actually been delivered and accepted
at the defendant's residence. 256 Given this consideration, it is difficult to
understand why the court stated that the case "involve[d] the issuance by
a magistrate of an anticipatory search warrant that authorizes the search
of premises when it is known that the contraband is on a sure course to
its destination there. ' 257 Nonetheless, the court "approv[ed] of the use
of anticipatory search warrants in appropriate instances," and stated that
"[tihe present case involves the issuance by a magistrate of an anticipa-
tory search warrant that authorizes the search of premises when it is
known that contraband is on a sure course to its destination. 258
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
The first federal court decision addressing the constitutionality of
246. 919 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1990).
247. Id. at 971.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 974.
256. Id. at 975.
257. Id. at 974. In fact, the affidavit "described how the UPS package was delivered to [the
defendant's] ranch and accepted by its occupants." Id. at 975.
258. Id. at 974.
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anticipatory search warrants was Beal v. Skaff.25 9 In Beal, federal agents
observed that a package sent by first class mail to the defendant was
"leaking" marijuana.26 ° State authorities in Wisconsin applied for a
warrant to search the defendant's home for the package which, accord-
ing to the affidavit, "will be delivered at or about 12:34 P.M., on Octo-
ber 24, 1967, by carrier delivery to [the defendant's home]." 2 6' The
warrant was issued at 12:15 P.M., October 24, while the package had
been delivered at 11:59 A.M. that day.2 62 Police searched the defen-
dant's home at 12:45 P.M.2 6 3
The defendant argued that the warrant was invalid, as it did not
state that the contraband was presently in the defendant's home, but
would be at the time police were to search the home. 264 The court stated
that although "a 'stale warrant,' the execution of which is unduly
delayed by the police in order to assure the seizure of the goods sought,
is invalid," this warrant was valid, as the police "obeyed the command
of the search warrant to execute it forthwith. ' 2 65 Probable cause existed
because "there was probable cause to believe that the parcel would be
delivered 19 minutes from the time of issuance, and probable cause to
believe that the warrant, when executed forthwith, could not be executed
until after such delivery took place," due to the sixteen-mile distance
"between the place of issuance and the place of execution. 2 66
No Seventh Circuit case again addressed the validity of an anticipa-
tory search warrant until 1996, when United States v. Leidner was
decided.26 7 In that case, Missouri police stopped a person for a traffic
violation.2 68 During the stop, police found 200 pounds of marijuana in
the trunk of his car .269 The driver told police that he rented the car to
transport the marijuana from Texas to Illinois, that the defendant had
agreed to pay him to do it, and that the defendant had paid him to do it
259. 418 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1969).
260. Id. at 431.
261. Id. at 432.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. The defendant based his argument on "the Fourth Amendment guarantee that 'no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularity
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be searched."' Id. at 432-33
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
265. Id. at 433.
266. Id. In addition, the court noted the need for "quick action by the magistrate," due to the
"very real possibility that delay might have resulted in [the contraband's] disposal or
concealment." Id. at 433-34.
267. 99 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996).
268. Id. at 1424.
269. Id.
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"on previous occasions."27° The driver then agreed to become an
informant, make a controlled delivery, and wear a wire during the con-
trolled delivery.27'
An Illinois law enforcement agent was contacted and agreed to
cooperate.2 7 2 The agent submitted an affidavit for a search warrant stat-
ing that the agent "had probable cause to believe that the marijuana
would be located at [the defendant's] residence based on the information
obtained from [the informant] during the traffic stop by the Missouri
police." '273 The magistrate issued the warrant, but the warrant did not
require that it be executed only after the informant made the delivery.274
The agent, however, testified at the suppression hearing that the issuing
magistrate told him "that since the warrant was an anticipatory search
warrant [the agent] had to wait until [the informant] made the delivery to
[the defendant's] residence before he could execute it." 2 75
The informant made the controlled delivery at the defendant's
home, but the defendant was not there at the time of the delivery. 276
Someone else was, though, and that person accepted delivery.277 Police
waited for the defendant to return home, at which time they executed the
search warrant.278
Of the defendant's numerous arguments, the two most relevant
were that the warrant failed to ensure the marijuana was on a "sure
course" to the defendant's residence (thus no nexus between the defen-
dant's residence and the contraband) and that the warrant failed to
explicitly condition its execution upon completion of the controlled
delivery.279
The court held that the warrant was valid, stating that "the alleged
transfer of contraband would occur at [the defendant's] residence, that
the affiant learned of this transfer from an informant, that the affiant
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. The agent was an inspector for the Southeastern Illinois Drug Task Force to whom the
informant was "known." Id.
273. Id. The affidavit also stated that the informant "'was in the process of delivering said
cannabis to [the defendant] at [the defendant's] residence;' that [the affiant] considered the
informant's statements to be reliable since they were offered against the informant's penal
interest; and that [the informant] 'agreed to cooperate with law enforcement personnel."'
274. Id. at 1425.
275. Id. at n.1.
276. Id. at 1425.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. The defendant also argued that the warrant was invalid "because it failed to describe
the role to be played by the police in the delivery ... it failed to include time restraints, and ... it
failed to reflect that the issuing magistrate exercised a supervisory function as a neutral and
detached magistrate." Id. at n.2.
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considered the informant reliable due to his against-interest statements,
and that the transfer would occur through a controlled delivery in coop-
eration with the police." '28 The fact that the warrant did not state that it
could not be executed until delivery did not render the warrant unconsti-
tutional.281  Finally, the court held that "all that is constitutionally
required is that the search warrant be supported by probable cause. "282
The defendant also argued that "the complaint failed to provide an
independent nexus between the marijuana and [the defendant's] resi-
dence" and "that the contraband was on a 'sure course' to the defen-
dant's home. '283 The defendant argued that the government created the
nexus itself, as the package was not mailed without police interven-
tion.284 Here, the informant could have said he was going to deliver the
contraband to anyone's home in order to save himself.285 In addition,
the defendant argued that even if the judge had instructed the officers
not to execute the warrant until the delivery was made, the government
had not demonstrated that all officers participating in the warrant's exe-
cution were told this. 286
The court rejected both of the defendant's arguments. This was,
the court stated, "essentially a government-controlled delivery" and that
the "totality of the circumstances" indicated that the contraband was on
a "sure course" to the defendant's home. 287 Also, the facts averred in
the affidavit, taken in the totality of the circumstances, provided a suffi-
cient nexus between the contraband and the defendant's home.288
In United States v. Dennis 289 a postal inspector observed a package
addressed to the defendant's residence that "matched a narcotics pack-
age profile developed by the United States Postal Service. '29° A drug-
280. Id. at 1427. Thus, "the warrant would survive scrutiny under Garcia." Id.
281. Id. at 1427, 1430 ("the lack of explicit conditioning language does not constitute a
constitutional defect").
282. Id. at 1427.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1428. That is:
[The defendant's] "'sure course' argument ... challenges whether the contraband
was on a sure course to [the defendant's] house before [the informant] was arrested.
In other words, [the defendant] argues that the warrant must show a connection
between [the defendant] and the contraband due to arrive at his house independent
of [the informant's] accusations.
Id. at 1429 n.7.
285. Id. at 1429.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1429-30.
288. Id.
289. 115 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 1997).
290. Id. at 527. The court stated, however:
The mere fact that certain characteristics that a law enforcement officer observes fit
a profile will not establish reasonable suspicion . . . . Here, the postal inspector
[Vol. 58:701
UNITED STATES v. MIGGINS
sniffing dog indicated the presence of narcotics, and a subsequent
search, pursuant to a warrant, revealed about sixteen ounces of
cocaine.29' The package was resealed, and a search warrant was
obtained in preparation for a controlled delivery.292
A postal inspector delivered the package the next day. 9 3 The
defendant signed for the package and took it into his home. 94 Police
executed the search warrant and found the package, but did not find any
other evidence of narcotics trafficking.295
The defendant argued that the warrant was defective for two rea-
sons. 2 96 First, he argued that it did not contain the triggering event on its
face or attach the affidavit containing that event to the warrant itself.297
Second, the defendant argued that no nexus existed between the package
and the place to be searched, in part because the affidavit "sought per-
mission to determine which apartment would be searched at the time of
the controlled delivery, based upon who accepted the package and into
which apartment it was taken. 298
The court rejected the defendant's arguments, first stating that the
warrant need not list the conditions precedent on its face or attach the
stated that the package aroused his suspicion because it was heavily taped, had been
sent from a private person to another private person, had been mailed from Los
Angeles, a city known to be a source city for narcotics distribution, and had been
mailed from a zip code different than the zip code listed in the return address. The
postal inspector explained that based on his five years of experience as a narcotics
investigator and based upon the narcotics package profile, these factors were
consistent with characteristics of other packages found to contain contraband. For
example, he explained that because of its high cost, only about five percent of all
Express Mail is personal correspondence and that because of its speed and reliability
and because the postal service provides a free telephone tracking service, drug
traffickers frequently use the service to send personal correspondence containing
contraband. Thus, he concluded that personal correspondence sent via Express Mail
is likely to contain contraband.
Id. at 532.
For a thorough discussion on the "resoundingly unexceptional" nature of these characteristics
as indicators of criminal behavior, see id. at 535-40 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
291. Id. at 527. The court stated that it would "uphold the detention here if the postal inspector
reasonably suspected that the package contained contraband and if the detention lasted for a
reasonable duration." Id. at 532. The inspector possessed reasonable suspicion. Id. And because
the detention lasted for "less than forty-eight hours and lasted only as long as necessary to subject
the package to a canine sniff," the search was not for an unreasonable duration. Id. at 533.
292. Id. at 527. Only "a portion of the cocaine" and "an electronic beeper" were placed in the
package.
293. Id.
294. id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 528.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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affidavit to the warrant so long as the affidavit does contain the condi-
tions precedent and the executing officers actually satisfy those condi-
tions.29 9 The warrant here satisfied that requirement because the warrant
itself stated that execution of it was subject to the conditions precedent
specified in the affidavit. 3" Further, the officers executing the warrant
complied with the instructions of the affidavit.3°'
The court next set out its discussion of a nexus requirement
between the package and the place to be searched, stating that one exam-
ple of a sufficient nexus would be showing that the contraband was on a
"sure course" to the place to be searched.30 2 Here, there was more of a
nexus than in Leidner, as there was nothing in the record indicating that
the contraband may not have been delivered to the defendant's resi-
dence.30 3 Discovering a package in the normal mail stream and subse-
quently replacing it into that stream should satisfy the sure-course
requirement.3 "
In United States v. Brack,3 °5 the defendant was convicted of con-
spiracy to distribute crack cocaine.30 6 The defendant sought suppression
of the evidence seized from his hotel room on the basis that the affidavit
did not present independent evidence to support probable cause that the
contraband would be located in the hotel room at the time of the search.
The defendant also argued that the affidavit failed to present evidence
that the contraband was on a sure course to the place to be searched.30 7
In this case, an informant told police that the defendant was selling
drugs out of a certain hotel room.30 8 A second informant made "con-
trolled purchase" of narcotics from the defendant's room, and the
description of the defendant matched that given by the original inform-
299. Id. at 529. "[Clonditions precedent to the execution of the warrant are integral to its
validity." Id. at 528.
300. Id. at 529.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 530. The court disagreed with the defendant's argument that the government should
be required to "show[] that [the defendant] or one of his agents mailed the package in Los
Angeles. However, we implicitly rejected this argument in Leidner... adopting instead a 'totality
of the circumstances' approach." Id. at 531.
303. Id. at 531.
304. Id. at 530. No other circumstances indicating that the sender intended the package to
arrive at the place to be searched or that the package was intended for the actual recipient,
although under this approach the court claims that the warrant would have still be valid, given the
amount of cocaine mailed and the trouble through which the sender went to conceal its contents.
Id. at 530. That is, sixteen ounces of cocaine "is too great an amount to be sent on a whim ...
[and] investigators had connected [the defendant] to narcotics activities in the past." Id. at 530-31.
305. 188 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 1999).
306. Id. at 753.
307. Id. at 757.
308. Id. at 755. The informant also told police that the defendant was a bald, six-foot-tall
African-American male weighing 160 pounds. Id.
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ant.3"9 A third informant told police that the defendant and man named
Smith would be driving to Chicago to buy cocaine and would return on
one of two nights.?' 0
"Based on this information, police sought and obtained a search
warrant contingent on the return of Smith and/or a black male meeting
the description of [the defendant]" to the hotel room on one of the two
nights the informant specified.3' On the first evening, police saw the
defendant return to the room and they executed the warrant, "seizing
drugs, a scale, a pager, and some clothes."'312
The defendant questioned the informant's reliability, but the court
held that the informants proved themselves reliable because the con-
trolled purchase by one informant confirmed that the defendant was sell-
ing drugs out of the hotel room, and the other informant's prediction
about the defendant's travel plans was "borne out." '313 Once the defen-
dant returned to the hotel room, as predicted by the informant, the trig-
gering event for the search occurred.31 4
The court held that the sure-course requirement was not applicable
in this case, as that requirement "is to prevent law enforcement authori-
ties or third parties from mailing or otherwise sending a controlled sub-
stance to a residence to 'create probable cause to search the premises
where it otherwise would not exist.' ""5 In this case, "neither the gov-
ernment nor a third party was involved in delivering the contraband to
[the hotel room]. The drugs were delivered by [the defendant]
himself." '3 16
In United States v. Limares,31 7 a narcotics dog alerted postal
inspectors to the presence of narcotics in a package.31 8 Postal inspectors
opened the package and found more than four pounds of
methamphetamine. 3 9 The package was resealed with a radio transmitter
that would signal the package's location and whether it had been
opened, and an anticipatory warrant was obtained to enter the premises
of the mailing address "after the delivery and opening of the
package.32°
309. Id.
310. Id. at 756.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 757 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 1997)).
316. Id.
317. 269 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2001).
318. Id. at 796.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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Agents made the delivery and someone signed for the package and
took it into the home.32' Minutes later, however, that person left the
house with the unopened package.322 The package was taken to another
house (the defendant's), and, as agents were trying to get a warrant for
the defendant's house, the transmitter indicated that the parcel had been
opened.323 Believing that whoever opened the package would notice the
transmitter and attempt to destroy the package's contents and all other
evidence in the house, and without attempting to secure a second war-
rant, agents immediately executed the warrant at the defendant's
house.324
The defendant argued that agents violated the Fourth Amendment
by entering his home without a warrant. 325 He responded to the govern-
ment's argument that they entered the house to stop the destruction of
evidence by stating that the government created the exigency by
allowing his friend to walk from the original house to the other without
arresting him, thus allowing the occupants of the defendant's house to
open the package. 326
The court held for the government, stating that government agents
do not have to make arrests at the earliest possible moment. 327 They
may continue their investigation to acquire additional evidence.328 And
if exigent circumstances intervene, created here by one suspect moving
the contraband from one house to another (for which agents could not
have obtained an anticipatory warrant), then the agents may act to pro-
tect evidence from being destroyed.329
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
United States v. Tagbering33 ° was the first Eighth Circuit case to
address the question of anticipatory search warrants. In Tagbering, the
United States Customs Service in Miami inspected a package sent from
Jamaica to Kansas City, Missouri.3 3' Inside the package, agents found a
large amount of illegal drugs.332 Agents resealed the package for a con-
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 796-97.
325. Id. at 798.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 799.
330. 985 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1993).
331. Id. at 948.
332. Id. Agents found 900 grams of hashish oil and 142 grams of marijuana. Id.
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trolled delivery and sought an anticipatory search warrant.333 The affi-
davit in support of the warrant application stated that the warrant would
not be executed "unless delivery occurs and the package is accepted.334
The controlled delivery occurred, and the defendant accepted the
package and took it inside the house.335 Minutes later, police executed
the warrant, arrested the defendant, and found the unopened package on
a kitchen counter.336
The defendant's main argument was that the warrant was invalid,
as it did not expressly condition the search upon a successful controlled
delivery "nor state that the warrant would be void if delivery did not
occur."
3 37 The court held, however, that the warrant "fairly construed,
did contain" the condition that the search was contingent on the con-
trolled delivery because the affidavit contained that contingency. 338 The
judge signed the affidavit and attached copies of it to the warrant.3 39
Since the contingency was contained in the affidavit, it need not be con-
tained in the warrant itself.34° Also, if police executed the warrant
before the controlled delivery, "then suppression may well be warranted
for that reason."34'
Decided only a few months subsequent to Tagbering, United States
v. Koelling342 dealt with an anticipatory warrant for child pornography.
In Koelling, a mail order photo-finishing business called police and said
they had film that they suspected contained child pornography.343 The
name on the return address was false, and the real occupant of the
address, "as a result of prior investigations . . . was known to have a
'preference for young boys.' ,344 The photographs depicted images of a
fourteen-year-old boy identified by the boy's principal as living near the
defendant.345 Police applied for a search warrant based on these facts as
333. Id. Most of the drugs were replaced with "look-alike substances." Id.
334. Id. The affidavit was prepared by a Kansas City detective who conducted surveillance of
the apartment to be searched and determined that it was likely occupied.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 949.
337. Id. at 950. The defendant also argued that the warrant was invalid because it did not
allege that the address to be searched was occupied, "that the package would be placed in the mail
for delivery," and "that the addressee would be there to receive the package when delivered." Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. It did not matter that the "affidavit was not incorporated into the warrant, [because] it
contained a representation to the issuing judge that the warrant would not be executed until the
package was delivered and accepted." Id.
341. Id.
342. 992 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1993).
343. Id. at 818.
344. Id. at 819.
345. Id. The defendant was also in some of the pictures. Id.
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well as affiant's statement that "based on my training and previous expe-
rience, I know that [the defendant] exhibits the traits common to many
pedophiles. I further know from this training and previous experience
that pedophiles or collectors of this matter keep these materials for many
months and years, and rarely, if ever, dispose of their collections." '346
The affidavit also stated that the search warrant would be executed when
the defendant received the package in his mail and took it into his
home.347
The magistrate issued the warrant, and the controlled delivery and
execution of the warrant proceeded as planned.348 The court held that
the warrant was valid:"3 49 "the statement in the affidavit that the warrant
would not be executed until delivery of the package to [the defendant's]
house could be confirmed was sufficient to establish probable cause for
the issuance of the warrant since the package would likely be found on
the premises. '"350 The officers complied with these conditions before
executing the warrant, so suppression was not required.,
In United States v. Bieri,352 an Oklahoma State Trooper stopped a
drug courier who was transporting marijuana from Arizona to the defen-
dant's farm in Missouri.353 The trooper searched his car, finding forty-
five pounds of marijuana.3 54 The courier then agreed to show authorities
where he was taking the marijuana (a place to which he claimed he had
previously delivered marijuana) and agreed to tape it.355 Police then
submitted an affidavit for an anticipatory search warrant, which the
judge granted with directions for the officers "to execute the warrant
only if [informant] made the delivery and the facts developed as the
officers expected."3 56 The informant delivered the marijuana, was paid
by the defendant, and the warrant was executed. 7
346. Id. at 819-20.
347. Id. at 820.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 823.
350. Id.
351. Id. Specifically, the court stated:
[A]fter the postal inspector observed the delivery of the photo mailing envelope, he
waited 5 to 10 minutes before executing the search warrant. Since [the defendant]
was discovered in possession of the photographs when the postal inspector entered
his house, it is clear that the execution of the warrant occurred after the controlled
delivery had taken place.
Id.
352. 21 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 1994).
353. Id. at 814.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. The judge issued the warrant "after reviewing the deputy sheriff's affidavit, oral
statements, and an aerial photograph of the [defendants'] property." Id.
357. Id.
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The defendant argued that the warrant was invalid because there
were no exigent circumstances and that the warrant was unsupported by
probable cause.358 Exigent circumstances, the court stated, are not nec-
essary: "An anticipatory search warrant should be upheld if independent
evidence shows the delivery of contraband will or is likely to occur and
the warrant is conditioned on that delivery." '359 The government showed
that the warrant was supported by probable cause because "[p]robable
cause exists when there are sufficient facts to justify the belief by a
prudent person that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
the place to be searched."3 6 Here, the totality of the circumstances sup-
ported a finding of probable cause.
36 1
United States v. Tellez3 62 also involved police use of an informant.
There, a police informant called the defendant and requested to purchase
methamphetamine.363  The defendant agreed, and brought the
methamphetamine to the informant's house.3" Later that day, informant
called the defendant again to arrange the sale of more
methamphetamine.365 The defendant agreed, and said that he would
bring it to the informant within a few hours.36 6
Officers then prepared an affidavit setting forth the facts above,
which they witnessed.3 67 The affidavit asked that the warrant to search
the defendant's home be granted in the event that narcotics were found
on the defendant or his vehicle.3 68 The magistrate issued the warrant
and it was executed as planned.369
The defendant argued that there was no nexus between the search
358. Id. The defendants also argued that "the warrant did not comply with state law ... was
overbroad in the description of the place to be searched... did not comply with Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41" and "was not executed in good faith." Id.
359. Id. (citing United States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1993)). Also, it did not
matter that the "affidavit was not incorporated by reference into the search warrant." Id. at 815.
In this case at least, "it [is] immaterial whether the application for the warrant contained specific
words of incorporation, because the application itself contains an adequate legal description
describing the farm and a reference to an accompanying aerial photograph," so the warrant was
not void for vagueness. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. "[P]robable cause existed because the officers had apprehended [the informant] with
approximately forty-five pounds of marijuana, and he told them he was delivering it to the [the
defendants'] farm." Id.
362. 217 F.3d 547 (8th Cir. 2000).
363. Id. at 549.
364. Id. Police then followed the defendant to his home, which they kept under surveillance.
Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. All of these events occurred in the span of one day. Id.
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of his car and the probability that drugs would be found in his home.37 °
This case was easy for the court, however; it held that the affidavit set
forth facts that "create a substantial basis for the magistrate to find that
there was probable cause to search [the defendant's] home, even if the
proposed condition (i.e., the discovery of narcotics on [the defendant's]
person or in his car) never occurred."3 7 '
The most recent Eighth Circuit case to address anticipatory search
warrants was United States v. Walker.372 In Walker, the defendant
allowed a gang (which had been under investigation by the DEA) to
deliver packages (via Express Mail) of crack cocaine from California to
her St. Paul residence.373
A postal inspector in Los Angeles noticed one such package and
found it to be suspicious. 3 74 The inspector sent the package through to
St. Paul and told a postal inspector there that the package was on its
way.
375
Once it arrived at St. Paul, the inspector there agreed that the pack-
age was suspicious and subjected it to a test by a drug-sniffing dog.37 6
The dog singled out the package addressed to the defendant, and a
search pursuant to a warrant revealed cocaine. 37 7 After a controlled
delivery to the defendant's address, agents searched her apartment. 378
The defendant argued that the warrant was not supported by proba-
ble cause as "it failed to describe with particularity the places to be
searched or the items to be seized. ' 37 9 The court disagreed, stating:
370. Id.
371. Id. This is so because:
The facts alleged in the affidavit indicate that [the defendant] was a drug dealer and
had offered to provide drugs in the future on demand. The informant had spoken
with [the defendant] over the telephone and had arranged for another sale. The new
sale was to take place in the immediate future, and the police knew that [the
defendant] had been at home and not anywhere else since leaving the informant's
residence.
Id.
372. 324 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2003).
373. Id. at 1035.
374. Id. The inspector became suspicious of the package because it "was a large U-Haul box
with handwritten labels. It had been dropped off at an airport facility sixty miles from the sender's
purported residence. The sender brought the package to the facility in a rental car, and paid the
delivery charge in cash." Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. The St. Paul inspector found the package suspicious because in twenty-one years as a
postal inspector (nine years in the narcotics division), "he had seen 'probably a hundred' U-Haul
type boxes that contained narcotics" and testified "that Los Angeles is known as a drug source city
where many narcotics packages originate." Id. at 1035-36.
377. Id. at 1036.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 1038.
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An anticipatory search warrant should be upheld if independent evi-
dence shows the delivery of contraband will or is likely to occur and
the warrant is conditioned on that delivery. Probable cause exists
when there are sufficient facts to justify the belief by a prudent per-
son that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place
to be searched.38 °
The government met that burden here, as the warrant affidavit stated that
the package was addressed to the defendant, that a search of the package
had revealed narcotics, that the agents intended to make a controlled
delivery to the address, and "that other evidence relating to identification
of the residents" would be present.38'
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
In United States v. Weber,382 an agent applying for a search warrant
alleged the following facts: Two years prior to the filing of the affidavit,
a customs inspector seized a parcel addressed to the defendant at his
address. 383 The package contained "two pieces of advertising material,
which the customs inspector concluded 'apparently depict[ed] the sexual
exploitation of children.' "384 Customs officials did not determine
whether the defendant ordered the material or if it was sent
unsolicited.385
On this basis, the defendant was targeted for investigation.386 The
government sent the defendant "an undercover test advertisement con-
taining the name and address of a purported distributor of sexually
explicit materials" selling pictures of "boys and girls in sex action. 
' 387
Without seeing the pictures, the defendant ordered some.388 A Customs
agent dressed as a delivery company courier was to deliver the pic-
tures.3 89 The affidavit stated that agents believed that the defendant not
only would have these photographs in his possession, but other illegal
pornographic material as well.390 This assumption was based on the
facts "and a general description of the proclivities of pedophiles. ' 39 '
380. Id. (quoting United States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 949 (8th Cir. 1993) and United
States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 811, 814 (8th Cir. 1994)) (internal citations omitted).
381. Id.
382. 923 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1990).
383. Id. at 1340.
384. Id. (alteration in original).
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. The defendant saw only the advertisement. Id.
389. Id. "The pictures the government intended to send depicted minors displaying their
genitals or engaging in various sexual acts . I..." d.
390. Id.
391. Id. The affidavit stated that pedophiles often videotape children and themselves, keep the
20041
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The warrant was signed and the material was mailed.392 The defen-
dant received it and took it into his home, whereupon the warrant was
executed.39 3 Agents found the unopened package as well as other
magazines depicting child pornography.394
The court held that the warrant was invalid because it was over-
broad, as it sought items for which there was no probable cause to
search.3 9 5 Thus, the affidavit established probable cause only for the
material that the agents mailed.396 The court noted that "nowhere in [the
agent's] affidavit is there even a conclusory recital that the evidence of
[the defendant's] demonstrated interest in child pornography - consist-
ing of one proven order - places him in the category of those
pedophiles, molesters, and collectors about whom [the agent] has exper-
tise. '3 97 Based on the facts of this case, the government would merely
need to place "phony advertisements for child pornography, wait for
responses, and immediately execute warrants to search the houses of
those responding affirmatively. 398
In United States v. Ruddell,399 the defendant wrote to an adult
bookstore "inquiring about obtaining videotapes of minors engaged in
sexually explicit conduct. The bookstore informed the United States
Postal Inspection Service of [the defendant's] interest in child pornogra-
phy." 4" An undercover agent replied, asking the defendant for more
information regarding his specific interests in child pornography.40 1 The
defendant responded, and the agent sent the defendant "a list of five
videotapes which depicted minors engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct. 4 °2 The defendant ordered one videotape and sent payment.4 °3
Another agent filed an affidavit for a search warrant for the defen-
dant's home.4" The agent wrote in the affidavit that she had "received
training in the area of sexual exploitation of minors," that she was told
the defendant had ordered the videotape, and that she possessed the
material around for long periods of time, and show the material to other children "to lower their
inhibitions so that the pedophile may molest them." Id. at 1341.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 1343. A warrant "must be no broader than the probable cause on which it is based."
Id. at 1342.
396. Id. at 1343.
397. Id. at 1341.
398. Id. at 1344.
399. 71 F.3d 331 (9th Cir. 1995).
400. Id. at 332.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
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videotape and intended to deliver it to the defendant's home.40 5 She also
stated that an Assistant United States Attorney told her that controlled
deliveries could provide probable cause for an anticipatory search war-
rant.406 The magistrate issued the warrant and the controlled delivery
was made.407 Agents executed the warrant and recovered the tape from
the defendant's home.40 8
Citing United States v. Hale," 9 the court stated "[a]n affidavit in
support of an anticipatory search warrant must show that the property
sought is on a sure course to the destination targeted for the search. 41 0
Here, a postal inspector "had explicitly described her plans to execute a
controlled delivery to [the defendant's] house in her affidavit in support
of the warrant. '411 Based on that, no doubt existed that the contraband
was on a sure course to the defendant's home.4t 2
In United States v. Hota14 13 the issue was whether an anticipatory
search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment if it fails to identify the
event.4 14 In Hotal, the defendant ordered two videotapes of child por-
nography in response to an undercover government advertisement.41 5 A
postal inspector applied for an anticipatory warrant, stating in the affida-
vit that the tapes would be delivered to the defendant's residence.41 6
The affidavit stated that the inspector would conduct surveillance of the
package until someone at the residence brought it into the house, "and
only when brought into the residence, this search warrant will be exe-
cuted. 41 7 The warrant stated that the affidavit was attached "and incor-
porated by reference," but did not specify the triggering event.
41 8
The delivery was made, the defendant took the tapes into his home,
and the warrant was executed. 419 There was no evidence that the exe-
cuting agents were in possession of the affidavit, or that the affidavit "in
any manner accompanied the warrant. 4
20
The court held that the warrant was invalid and all evidence seized
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. 784 F.2d 1465, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1986).
410. Ruddell, 71 F.3d at 333.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. 143 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998).
414. Id. at 1224.
415. Id. at n.2.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 1224-25.
418. Id. at 1225.
419. Id.
420. Id.
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
pursuant to it must be suppressed,42 1 stating that "when a warrant's exe-
cution is dependent on the occurrence of one or more conditions, the
warrant itself must state the conditions precedent to its execution and
these conditions must be clear, explicit, and narrow. '4 22 Yet the court
also stated that the triggering event does not have to actually appear only
on the face of the warrant, but "must appear in the court-issued warrant
and attachments that those executing the search maintain in their imme-
diate possession in order to guide their actions and to provide informa-
tion to the person whose property is being searched. 42 3
The most recent Ninth Circuit case on the subject was United States
v. Vesikuru.424 In Vesikuru, narcotics agents discovered a microwave
with a jar of phencyclidine (PCP) being mailed to an address in Seat-
tle.425 A Seattle DEA agent applied for a warrant. The affidavit for the
search warrant stated that the warrant was "anticipatory" and would
become effective on observation of someone accepting the package and
taking it into the residence.4 26 A district court issued the warrant, indi-
cating in the warrant that probable cause to search was based upon the
affidavit and that the affidavit was attached to the warrant.427 Agents
delivered the package to the residence, and the defendant took it into the
home.4 2 8 The subsequent search produced crack cocaine, PCP, and
marijuana.429
The defendant argued the warrant was invalid based on its failure to
state on its face the conditions precedent to its execution.430 The court
reiterated the rule from Hotal that conditions precedent to a search must
be stated in the warrant. 431 The court further stated that "a warrant may
be construed with reference to the affidavit." '432 The court went on to
state, however, "that the affidavit must accompany the warrant and be
421. Id. at 1228.
422. Id. at 1226.
423. Id. at 1227. "[In order to comply with the Fourth Amendment, an anticipatory search
warrant must either on its face or on the face of the accompanying affidavit, clearly, expressly,
and narrowly specify the triggering event." Id.
424. 314 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2002).
425. Id. at 1118. A drug-sniffing dog initially alerted agents to the package, who then opened
it pursuant to a search warrant. Id. at 1117-18.
426. Id. at 1118.
427. Id. In addition, the court stated that "[a]t all relevant times prior to and during the search
of [the defendant's] home, the affidavit physically accompanied the search warrant." Id. Also,
"[tihe searching officers were fully briefed on the restrictions found in the affidavit, and the ...
officers complied with all of the required conditions." Id. at 1117.
428. Id. at 1119.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 1120 (quoting Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir.
2002)). The warrant was supported by probable cause due to the sure course to its destination, so
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incorporated by reference in order to be considered in conjunction with
the warrant.
4 33
Unlike in Hotal, the affidavit did accompany the warrant when
agents executed the search.434 As this condition was satisfied and the
government sufficiently demonstrated that the package was on a "sure
course" to the place to be searched, the search was constitutional.
4 35
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
In United States v. Hugoboom,43 6 a postal inspector working at
Denver International Airport saw a suspicious express mail package
addressed to an individual in Wyoming. 37 A drug-sniffing dog indi-
cated the presence of narcotics in the package.4 38 A subsequent search
revealed 215 grams of ephedrine."39
Working with the Wyoming DEA, postal officials made arrange-
ments to carry out a controlled delivery of the parcel. 40 The govern-
ment asked a magistrate to issue a search warrant with execution
"contingent upon the delivery of the parcel to a responsible adult at the
residence ... who willingly" accepts delivery. 4 1 The magistrate issued
the search warrant, which was subsequently executed." 2
The defendant argued that there was not sufficient probable cause
to support the warrant because the affidavit referred only to the proposed
controlled delivery and that there was no independent evidence of any
other illegal narcotics activity going on at the defendant's residence." 3
However, the court stated that the affidavit need only refer to the con-
trolled delivery and show that the contraband is on a sure course to the
place to be searched in order to satisfy probable cause."" In this case,
the government satisfied that burden." 5  Additionally, the affidavit
listed the condition precedent." 6 This was sufficient, as the warrant
there was "a substantial basis for concluding that, once the package was accepted and taken into
the residence, evidence relating to drug trafficking could be found therein." Id. at 1122.
433. Id. at 1120 n.3.
434. Id. at 1122.
435. Id.
436. 112 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 1997).
437. Id. at 1083.
438. Id.
439. Id. The search was made pursuant to a warrant. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 1086.
444. Id. at 1086-87.
445. Id.
446. Id. ("[ulpon delivery to a willing adult and upon obtaining a signed receipt for such
delivery, the search warrant would then be executed").
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itself did not need to specify the triggering event. 47
United States v. Rowland448 dealt not with narcotics but with a con-
trolled delivery of child pornography. A postal inspector learned that
the defendant had filled out a questionnaire expressing an interest in
child pornography." 9 He gave his name and the address of his post
office box.450 Three years later, the government mailed the defendant
another advertisement. 41 The defendant replied, "indicating an interest
in young girls, videotapes, magazines, and 'possibly meetings.' ,,452 The
government sent yet another letter, this one containing prices and
descriptions of nine videotapes.453 The defendant ordered two video-
tapes.454 Subsequently, the government learned the defendant's identity,
place of employment, and his home address.455 They obtained an antici-
patory warrant to search his residence, which could be executed "once
the package containing the videotapes was brought into the
residence." '456
Agents then delivered the tapes to the defendant's mailbox.457 The
defendant received the package and took it to his place of employ-
ment.458 He left work around 4:30 that afternoon, but agents could not
determine whether he had the tapes. 459 The defendant drove home and
went into his house, but agents still could not establish whether he had
the tapes. 460 The agents knocked on the door, and the defendant's wife
let them in.46 1 They asked the defendant where the tapes were located,
and he indicated that they were in a backpack about five feet away from
him.462 The agents then executed the search warrant.463
The court began its analysis by reciting the requirements for antici-
patory search warrants. The issuing magistrate must determine that
there is probable cause to believe that the items to be seized will be at
447. Id.
448. 145 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 1998).
449. Id. at 1198-99.
450. Id. at 1199. The post office box was actually rented in another person's name, but the
defendant "was authorized to receive mail there." Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 1199-1200. The defendant told agents that the actual package in which the tapes
were mailed was at his place of employment. Id.
463. Id. at 1200.
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the place to be searched when it is searched. 4" In addition, probable
cause for anticipatory warrants is contingent on the occurrence of a trig-
gering event, so the magistrate must also consider the likelihood of the
event's actual occurrence.465 Next, the issuing magistrate must deter-
mine the likelihood that after the triggering event occurs, the contraband
will be at the place to be searched (that is, there must be a sufficient
nexus between the contraband and the search locale). 466 Lastly, the war-
rant or affidavit "should express conditions permitting the search to be
conducted only after the [triggering event has] taken place. 4 67
In this case, the affidavit provided probable cause to believe that
the defendant's post office box would harbor criminal activity.468 This
determination alone, however, does not provide probable cause to
believe that his house would contain the same criminal activity.469 No
evidence existed that he was likely to use his home to store contraband,
or that he would take this particular contraband there.470 The defen-
dant's home was one of many possible destinations for the contra-
band,471' and the mere inference that he would take the tapes home was
insufficient probable cause to believe that the contraband would be in
his house at the time the warrant was executed. 47 2 Despite that conclu-
sion, the court held that the good-faith exception applied.47 3
The next Tenth Circuit case to address the validity of an anticipa-
464. Id. at 1201.
465. Id. Thus, if the triggering event does not occur, the search warrant is void.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 1202. As for probable cause for government-controlled deliveries, the court stated,
"when the affidavit refers to a controlled delivery of contraband to the place designated for search,
the nexus requirement of probable cause is satisfied and the affidavit need not provide additional
independent evidence linking the place to be searched to criminal activity." Id. at 1202-03.
468. Id. at 1204. In addition, the court stated:
When the delivery of contraband is not completely within the government's control,
however, or when the delivery is to be made to a place other than the premises
designated for search, additional reliable information in the warrant application
must indicate that the contraband will be at the designated premises at the time of
the search. For example, when the delivery of contraband is not within the control
of the government, the supporting affidavit should show not only that the agent
applying for the warrant believes a delivery of contraband is going to occur, but also
how the agent learned of the expected delivery, how reliable the information is, and
what the role of law enforcement officers will be in the expected delivery ...
[s]imilarly, when a controlled delivery is not made to the place to be searched, such
as when a defendant is required to pick up a package containing contraband at a post
office, the warrant application must present additional facts establishing the
contraband will be taken to the place designated for search.
Id. at 1203.
469. Id. at 1205.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 1207-08 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
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tory search warrant was United States v. Lora-Solano,474 where two
defendants appealed convictions for possession with intent to distribute
controlled substances.475
An informant agreed to perform a controlled delivery of narcotics
to a residence in Salt Lake City, Utah,4 76 but the warrant listed a defi-
cient address.47 7 On the evening of the delivery, though, agents watched
several people from the actual house to be searched remove items from
the informant's car and take them into the house.478 Agents then exe-
cuted the warrant and recovered fifty pounds of marijuana and one kilo-
gram of cocaine.479
In holding the warrant valid, the court began its discussion by
stating:
An anticipatory search warrant, such as the warrant in this case, is
valid "when the warrant application indicates there will be a govern-
ment-controlled delivery of contraband to the place to be searched,
probable cause for a search will be established ... and provided the
warrant's execution is conditioned on the contraband's delivery to, or
receipt at, the designated place." '48
The court then held that "[b]y adequately stating the conditions pre-
cedent to the warrant's execution (particularly the cooperation of the
informant) in the affidavit, the warrant is valid despite the lack of a
physical description of the premises. '"481 The court next clarified that
"adequately" did not mean "explicitly:"
The references in the warrant to the controlled delivery of drugs may
not strictly be conditions precedent to the execution of the warrant,
but we can still look at the warrant as a whole and see that the war-
rant (and the supporting affidavit) make extensive reference to
expected drug sale.482
474. 330 F.3d 1288 (10th Cir. 2003).
475. Id. at 1290. The defendants argued (among other things) that the warrant lacked
particularity since it listed the wrong address and did not physically describe the house, and that
the supporting affidavit "incorrectly alleged that a conversation between the police informant and
Mr. Cortez-Cruz took place and was recorded." Id. at 1293. The discussion here will be limited
to the "anticipatory" aspects of the warrant.
476. Id. at 1291. One of the defendants, Nicholas Cortez Cruz, owned the house, and the
other, Jose Juan Lora-Solano, was renting a room. Id.
477. Id. The warrant listed the address as "2021 Camelot Way" but the correct address was
"2051 Camelot Way." Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 1292 (quoting United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998)).
481. Id. at 1292-93 (citing United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 1997)). The
court stated, "the probable cause requirement is satisfied by reference to a controlled delivery of
contraband in the supporting affidavit." Lora-Solano, 330 F.3d at 1292.
482. Lora-Solano, 330 F.3d at 1294.
[Vol. 58:701
UNITED STATES v. MIGGINS
The most recent Tenth Circuit case to deal with an anticipatory
warrant was United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez.483 There, a narcot-
ics dog in Denver, Colorado, "alerted" federal agents to cocaine in a
UPS package.484 Inside the package, the agents found three kilograms
of cocaine.485
In the subsequent application for an anticipatory warrant, the affi-
davit in support of the warrant stated that the search would be executed
"when the delivery is made by [the undercover detective]. 486 The
agents then made the delivery and executed the warrant, seizing the
package, "two plastic bags of cocaine," and more than two pounds of
methamphetamine. 487 The defendant was sentenced to 235 months in
488prison.
The defendant's two primary points on appeal were that neither the
warrant nor affidavit sufficiently described the triggering event, and that
the affidavit describing the triggering event was not "attached to the
warrant at the time it was executed." '489 The court framed the issue as
whether the description of the triggering event was sufficiently
described, "and whether that description was required to appear on the
face of the warrant or in papers physically attached to the warrant.
490
First, the court held that the affidavit did sufficiently describe the
triggering event as it stated that the warrant would be executed "when
delivery is made by [the undercover detective], ' 491 and that this condi-
tion, read "[a]s a matter of common usage," could be construed only to
mean that the "package containing dangerous contraband" had to be
taken into the place to be searched, and not merely left "on the door-
step. '492 The "'reference to a controlled delivery of contraband in the
supporting affidavit'" also satisfied the probable cause requirement.493
Second, the court held Tenth Circuit jurisprudence "explicitly"
rejected the notion that an anticipatory warrant needed to include on its
face the condition precedent, and refused to adopt the Ninth Circuit's
requirement that the conditions precedent must be stated either in the
warrant or in the affidavit that is actually attached to the warrant.494 The
483. 352 F.3d 1325 (10th Cir. 2003).
484. Id. at 1327.
485. Id.
486. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
487. Id.
488. Id. at 1328.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 1330.
491. Id. at 1331-32.
492. Id. at 1332.
493. Id. (quoting United States v. Lora-Solano, 330 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 2003)).
494. Id.
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facts that the affidavit in support of the warrant contained the condition
precedent and that the warrant "incorporated [the affidavit] by refer-
ence" precluded any finding of a Fourth Amendment violation.495
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
The Eleventh Circuit first confronted anticipatory warrants in a
footnote in United States v. Nixon.496 Although not directly at issue in
the case, the court noted that anticipatory warrants "are appropriate only
where the contraband is on a 'sure course' to a known destination, such
as through the mail. ' 497 Ten years later, in United States v. Santa,4 9 8 the
court recognized that it had addressed anticipatory warrants in a foot-
note, but stated that "[i]t is well settled, however, 'that no opinion can be
considered as binding unless the case calls for its expression. "' 499 The
court was thus free to reexamine the issue in Santa.
In Santa, DEA agents working with a confidential informant made
plans to buy a large amount of heroin from the defendant at the defen-
dant's apartment. 500 Agents knew ahead of time that the exchange was
going to take place, but instead of securing an anticipatory warrant, the
agents chose to allow the transaction to take place. Without a warrant,
agents searched the apartment where the exchange took place, and then
attempted to justify the search based on exigent circumstances.5 °'
The court first held, like every other circuit, that anticipatory war-
rants are not per se unconstitutional." 2 As with any other warrant,
"there must be a sufficient nexus between the contraband to be seized
and the place to be searched before an anticipatory warrant can be
issued."5 °3 A warrant affidavit must state not only that the government
agent believes that a delivery of contraband is going to occur, but how
he obtained that belief, the reliability of his sources, and what part the
government will play in the delivery. 5"
Here, the DEA agents could have easily obtained a warrant but
chose not to.505 Thus, "in circumstances . . . where law enforcement
agents have ample time and information to secure an anticipatory search
warrant, lack of time to obtain a warrant after delivery of the contraband
495. Id. at 1327, 1332.
496. 918 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1990).
497. Id. at 903 n.6.
498. 236 F.3d 662 (11th Cir. 2000).
499. Id. at 671 n.14 (citing Indiviglio v. United States, 249 F.2d 549, 561 (5th Cir. 1957)).
500. Id. at 664-65.
501. Id. at 666-67.
502. Id. at 673.
503. Id. (citing United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 1999)).
504. Id. (citing United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1989)).
505. Id. at 673-74.
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is insufficient to justify a warrantless search. 50 6
INTER-CIRCUIT NON-UNIFORMITY
While each circuit borrows (in varying degrees) from the others,
the preceding survey illustrates the fact that inter-circuit non-uniformity
is the general rule. Since non-uniformity is the rule, one consequence is
that a citizen within the geographic confines of one circuit may receive
more or less protection under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution than the same citizen would receive for identical
conduct in a different circuit. While there are some aspects of the law
that undoubtedly are best served on a more regional basis, protection
under the Federal Constitution is not one of them.
Every circuit demands that probable cause exist for issuance of
anticipatory search warrants, but the similarities end there. The various
circuits' jurisprudence is patchwork. Courts approve aspects of other
circuits' rulings that they endorse while disavowing other aspects they
disagree with.507 Some circuits, for example, demand that for an antici-
patory search warrant to be valid, the contraband must be on a "sure
course" to the place to be searched. 0 ' Other circuits discuss "sure
506. Id. at 674.
507. See, e.g., United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1996) (in discussing the
constitutionality of a warrant, "we do not believe that an anticipatory search warrant's
constitutionality is doomed by the absence of such language even though other circuit courts in
reviewing similar challenges to anticipatory warrants have significantly focused on the presence
or absence of such conditioning language"); United States v. Vesikuru, 314 F.3d 1116, 1119, 1120
n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998), for the
proposition that "[i]f the triggering event does not occur, probable cause to search is lacking,"
while later stating that "[o]ther circuits have concluded that an anticipatory search warrant is valid
even if the condition precedent is not stated on the face of the warrant," but "[t]he rule in our
Circuit ... is that the affidavit must accompany the warrant and be incorporated by reference in
order to be considered in conjunction with the warrant."
508. See United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[w]e adopt the 'sure and
irreversible course' standard as a means of judging the validity of anticipatory warrants"); United
States v. Ruddell, 71 F.3d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465,
1468-69 (9th Cir. 1986)) ("[a]n affidavit in support of an anticipatory search warrant must show
that the property sought is on a sure course to the destination targeted for the search"); United
States v. Vesikuru, 314 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting same); United States v. Lawson,
999 F.2d 985, 988 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[United States v.] Rey may be read to stand for the proposition
that a warrant to search an address may be based solely on the fact that a package containing
illegal substances is on a 'sure course' to a destination (like the mail)"); United States v.
Dorhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 36
(4th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations omitted) (an anticipatory search warrant for child pornography
was valid "where the contraband to be seized is on a sure course to its destination, as in the mail").
The court in Dornhofer, however, also stated that the "sure course" standard was a "requirement"
demanded by Goodwin. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d at 1198. See also United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d
524, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that an example of a "sufficient nexus between the parcel and
place to be searched" would be showing that contraband was on a "sure course" to the search
destination, although in the same case, the court referred to the sure course standard as a
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:701
course" as a factor in determining the validity of an anticipatory search
warrant, while not explicitly adopting it as the standard." ° Circuits also
differ on whether, and to what extent, conditions precedent (or "trigger-
ing events") must be included (or incorporated) in the face of an antici-
patory search warrant.51 °
"requirement"); United States v. Brack, 188 F.3d 748, 757 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Dennis, 115
F.3d at 528, 530) (stating "that the contraband be on a 'sure course' to the location to be searched"
is a "requirement[ I ... because 'warrants conditioned on future events present some potential for
abuse"'). The Brack court, however, later stated that "'[i]t is unclear how, or whether, the
heightened 'sure course' requirement applies to anticipatory warrants outside the controlled
delivery context"' (quoting United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1203 n.3 (10th Cir. 1998)).
509. See United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir. 1989) ("a wide variety of state
and federal courts have upheld the anticipatory search warrant against constitutional challenge at
least where the contraband is on a sure course to its destination") (internal quotations omitted); see
also United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 974-76 (5th Cir. 1990) (upholding "the issuance by a
magistrate of an anticipatory search warrant that authorizes the search of premises when it is
known that contraband is on a sure course to its destination," although the contraband had been
delivered to the place to be searched before the search warrant was issued); United States v.
Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1204 n.3 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[t]he sure course standard
functions as a proxy for the actual presence of the contraband at the locus to be searched," but
deciding that the court "need not further determine whether the more stringent 'sure course'
requirement is a necessary prerequisite to validity for all anticipatory warrants"). See also United
States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 672 n.14 (11th Cir. 2000). In Santa, the Eleventh Circuit
recognized that the court "addressed the issue [of anticipatory search warrants] in a footnote,
stating that 'we note that [anticipatory search] warrants are appropriate only where the contraband
is on a 'sure course' to a known destination such as through the mail."' (citing United States v.
Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 903 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1990)). The court continued that "[iut is well settled,
however, that no opinion can be considered as binding authority unless the case calls for its
expression." (citation omitted). The court, however, did not subsequently rule on the issue
expressly.
510. See generally Brett R. Hamm, Note: United States v. Hotal: Determining the Role of
Conditions Precedent in the Constitutionality of Anticipatory Warrants, 1999 BYU L. Rav. 1005
(1999); see also United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1993) ("contraband must be
on a sure and irreversible course to its destination, and a future search of the destination must be
made expressly contingent upon the contraband's arrival there"); United States v. Gendron, 18
F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994) ("a warrant must clearly say when it takes effect," and "courts have
required that the conditions upon which anticipatory warrants become effective be 'explicit, clear,
and narrowly drawn"'); United States v. Moetamedi, 46 F.3d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1995)
(anticipatory search warrant "valid even though it does not state on its face the conditions
precedent for its execution, when, (1) 'clear, explicit, and narrowly drawn' conditions for the
execution of the warrant are contained in the affidavit that applies for the warrant application, and
(2) those conditions are actually satisfied before the warrant is executed"); United States v. Loy,
191 F.3d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1999) (anticipatory search warrants "which meet the probable cause
requirement and specifically identify the triggering event are not per se unconstitutional"); United
States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1991) (it is "preferable" that an anticipatory warrant
specify that it be executed only after controlled delivery occurs, but "silence on this point does not
render it void"); see also United States v. Ware, 338 F.3d 476, 482 (6th Cir. 2003) (warrant valid
as an anticipatory warrant where it allows for an immediate search so long as "an objectively
reasonable officer would likely have concluded that the warrant legally authorized a search of the
apartment only upon the controlled delivery of the [contraband]"); United States v. Dennis, 115
F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 1997) (anticipatory warrant need not state conditions precedent to its
execution as long as affidavit contains "'clear, explicit and narrowly drawn' conditions and the
executing officers actually satisfy those conditions before executing the warrant," and if the
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In Hernandez-Rodriguez,51" for example, the Tenth Circuit
declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit rule concerning conditions precedent
despite the "urg[ing]" from the defendant's counsel.5 12 The rule for the
Ninth Circuit is that an anticipatory warrant must explicitly state the
conditions precedent either in the warrant or, alternatively, state in the
affidavit, which must be attached to the warrant.513 After articulating
the Tenth Circuit rule, the court found that its "jurisprudence is in accord
with that of the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits." 5 4 The
court continued, stating that the Tenth Circuit, in the "good company" of
those other circuits, had "no reason to depart from our earlier cases, even
if we were free to do so, which we are not.. . .Absent an intervening
Supreme Court or en banc decision justifying such action, we lack the
power to overrule our own precedent."5"5
This statement is indicative of the need for Supreme Court action.
The various circuits, even if willing to adopt uniform jurisprudence,
would find it to be a slow and difficult (if not impossible) process. The
circuits already have set out on different courses, and are for the most
part content with the status quo. They are, as the Tenth Circuit in Her-
nandez-Rodriguez recognized, to a large degree without the power or
motivation to alter their own precedent.
In contrast to the preceding examples of inter-circuit non-uniform-
ity, United States v. Miggins provides an excellent example of intra-
circuit non-uniformity. In upholding the validity of the search and war-
officers actually satisfy those conditions precedent the affidavit does not need to be attached to the
warrant); United States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1993) ("even if [the]affidavit
was not incorporated into the warrant, it contained a representation to the issuing judge that the
warrant would not be executed until the package was delivered and accepted. In such
circumstances, we do not believe the Constitution requires that this limitation be written into the
warrant itself'); United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998) ("in order to comply
with the Fourth Amendment, an anticipatory search warrant must either on its face or on the face
of the accompanying affidavit, clearly, expressly, and narrowly specify the triggering event");
United States v. Vesikuru, 314 F.3d 1116, 1120 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[tjhe rule in our Circuit...
is that the affidavit must accompany the warrant and be incorporated by reference in order to be
considered in conjunction with the warrant"); United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1202 n.2
(10th Cir. 1998) ("there is no Fourth Amendment violation requiring suppression when the
conditions for execution of the anticipatory warrant are stated in the affidavit that solicits the
warrant, accepted by the issuing magistrate, and actually satisfied in the execution of the warrant")
(internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d 1325,
1331-32 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted) ("it is the preferred practice for the
anticipatory warrant to itself set out, or incorporate by reference, the conditions for the warrant's
execution, but.., there is no Fourth Amendment violation when the conditions are set forth in the
affidavit that solicits the warrant").
511. See supra n.482 and accompanying text.
512. United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d 1325, 1332 (10th Cir. 2003).
513. Id. (citing United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998)).
514. Id.
515. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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rant upon which the searched was based, the Miggins court cited author-
ity from a variety of circuits, including its own.516 Some of the cited
precedent, however, is perhaps misapplied, and the result is the
announcement of a new Sixth Circuit rule for the validity of anticipatory
search warrants.
The affidavit for the search warrant for Moore's home stated that
"[w]hen [the contraband] is delivered to [Moore's] address and posses-
sion of the package is taken by someone inside [Moore's residence], as
is anticipated, then and only then will the search warrant be exe-
cuted."'5 17 The court, however, held that this triggering event was satis-
fied when someone accepted the package outside of the house because
they may have been inside of the house prior to accepting the pack-
age.5 "  The court cited the First Circuit's Gendron decision in sup-
port.51 9 The court also held the warrant to be satisfactory despite the
absence of the triggering event, as "the affidavit attached in support of
the warrant specified the triggering event. 9520
The court further held in its determination that the triggering event
was "consistent with this Court's reasoning and result in Jackson."'5 2 1 In
Jackson, execution of a search warrant could occur "if, and only if, the
package [was] accepted and taken inside the subject premises. 522
Agents delivered the contraband and as they executed the warrant, they
discovered the defendant fleeing through the backyard. 523 The court
held that "'the search warrant was not invalid simply because it failed to
require the package to remain on the premises."' 524
While the Miggins court's recitation of the Jackson rule is valid
Sixth Circuit jurisprudence, it is perhaps misapplied. The obvious dif-
ference is that the defendant in Jackson actually took the contraband into
the place to be searched. In Miggins, the contraband that was the subject
of the controlled delivery never saw the inside of the defendant's home.
516. See generally United States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2002).
517. Id. at 389 (first alteration in original).
518. Id. at 395.
519. Id. (citing United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 966 (1st Cir. 1994) (alteration in
original) (warrants and their supporting documents are to be read "not 'hypertechnical[ly],' but in
a 'commonsense' fashion").
520. Id. Note that this would not be sufficient under the Ninth Circuit standard. See Hotal,
143 F.3d at 1227 ("[i]n order to comply with the Fourth Amendment, an anticipatory search
warrant must either on its face or on the face of the accompanying affidavit, clearly, expressly,
and narrowly specify the triggering event"); Vesikuru, 314 F.3d at 1120 n.3 ("[t]he rule in our
Circuit ... is that the affidavit must accompany the warrant and be incorporated by reference in
order to be considered in conjunction with the warrant").
521. Id. at 396.
522. Id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 55 F.3d 1219, 1221 (6th Cir. 1995)).
523. Id. (citing Jackson, 55 F.3d at 1221).
524. Id. (citing Jackson, 55 F.3d at 1224).
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The court explains away this difference by the fact that "the package
was taken by someone who had been inside the premises just prior to the
delivery of the package. 525
While purportedly basing its decision on "the reasoning and result
in Jackson," the court actually announced a new rule and standard for
the validity of anticipatory search warrants. Under the Sixth Circuit's
new rule, an anticipatory search warrant is valid if "there [is] sufficient
contact between the parcel that [is] addressed to [a defendant's] resi-
dence and [someone] who [is] identified with this residence and who
sign[s] for the parcel. ' 526
CONCLUSION
Anticipatory search warrants have been and will continue to serve
as an effective instrument for law enforcement. They are valuable con-
stitutional devices. The importance of these warrants, coupled with the
variety of approaches among the circuits, however, signals that the juris-
prudence in this area of the law should be unified by the definitive
authority on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the United States
Supreme Court. The inability and unwillingness of the circuits to adopt
uniform jurisprudence and the Sixth Circuit's recent misapplication of
its own law in Miggins are indicative of the need for uniformity.
While some aspects of the law are best left for a more regional
application, treatment under the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution is not one of them, and until the Supreme Court establishes a
uniform rule, the circuits will continue to diverge not only from one
another, but even from their own jurisprudence, as the Sixth Circuit did
in Miggins. The result will be tangible to citizens residing in the several
jurisdictions when, for example, conduct occurring in one jurisdiction is
treated differently than identical conduct that occurred in another juris-
diction. The issue is ripe for Supreme Court adjudication, and the need
for uniformity is plain - every citizen, no matter where situated,
deserves equality of treatment under the Fourth Amendment.
JOSHUA D. POYER*
525. Id. The very fact that the person who accepted the package actually went inside Moore's
home was also contested. See id.
526. Id. at 397.
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